The Therapeutic Justification for Withholding Medical Information: What You Don\u27t Know Can\u27t Hurt You, or Can It? by Patterson, Elizabeth G.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 4 Article 7
1985
The Therapeutic Justification for Withholding
Medical Information: What You Don't Know Can't
Hurt You, or Can It?
Elizabeth G. Patterson
University of South Carolina School of Law, libba@law.sc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth G. Patterson, The Therapeutic Justification for Withholding Medical Information: What You Don't Know Can't Hurt You, or Can
It?, 64 Neb. L. Rev. (1985)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol64/iss4/7
Elizabeth G. Patterson*
The Therapeutic Justification for
Withholding Medical Information:
What You Don't Know Can't Hurt
You, or Can It?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................... 721
II. Therapeutic Nondisclosures in Current Law .............. 724
A. The Professional Standard ............................ 724
B. The Materiality Standard ............................. 731
III. The Medical Validity of the Therapeutic Justification .... 734
A. The Concept of Harm ................................. 735
B. Secondary Effects of Anxiety ......................... 738
C. Placebo Effects ........................................ 747
D. Rejection of Proferred Treatment as Harm ........... 752
IV. The Legal Validity of the Therapeutic Justification ....... 755
V. Protecting the Patient's Choice of Nondisclosure ......... 762
VI. Conclusion ................................................. 771
I. INTRODUCTION
American courts have been receptive to the doctrine of informed
consent. The notion that a medical patient has a right to decide what
will be done to his body, and to know the nature, risks, benefits, and
alternatives involved in any proposed medical procedure, seems to
flow naturally from fundamental principles of individual liberty, not
to mention life and the pursuit of happiness.' Although many aspects
of liberty have necessarily been limited to enable individuals to enjoy
the reciprocal advantages of living in an ordered society, the words of
John Stuart Mill's famous essay On Liberty retain force:
* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law.
1. See The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776); U.S. CoNsT. AMENDS. V & XIV;
I PRESIDENT'S COMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS
16-17 (1982) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
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That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will make him hap-
pier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even
right.... Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign. 2
This bodily sovereignty bars the physician from proceeding with treat-
ment based only on his own view of what is best for the patient, and it
bars him from proceeding pursuant to a consent that is empty because
lacking a basis in fact.3 Thus the law places on the physician a duty to
disclose to the patient such information as is necessary to a knowl-
edgeable treatment decision. 4
The doctrine of informed consent guarantees to the patient the
right to determine for himself whether the benefits of treatment5 or
other medical procedures proposed by the physician are outweighed
by adverse aspects such as pain, side-effects, or risks. The patient is
free to consent or to refuse the proposed treatment based on his evalu-
ation of these factors within the context of his own values and life-
style. He is free to disagree with his physician's expert determination
and to accept risks that his physician views as unnecessarily high.6
2. J. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
73 (1972). See generally R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETmcs (1981).
3. As noted in W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 119 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEE-
TON]: "A plaintiff cannot ordinarily be regarded as actually consenting to the de-
fendant's conduct if the plaintiff assented to the conduct while mistaken about
the nature and quality of the invasion intended by the defendant."
4. See id. at 189-90. The physician is normally required to impart information con-
cerning the nature, risks, benefits, and alternatives to a medical procedure. See,
e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). In Georgia,
however, this duty does not encompass disclosure of risks or alternatives but only
the nature of the treatment. See Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App. 737, 738, 222 S.E.2d
113, 114 (1975).
5. Henceforth, the word "treatment" will be used to refer to not only treatment, but
also diagnostic testing and any other type of medical procedure.
6. As the court in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972),
stated:
In many instances, to the physician, whose training and experience en-
able a self-satisfying evaluation, the particular treatment which should
be undertaken may seem evident, but it is the prerogative of the patient,
not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which he
believes his interests lie....
A medical doctor, being the expert, appreciates the risks inherent in
the procedure he is prescribing, the risks of a decision not to undergo the
treatment, and the probability of a successful outcome of the treatment.
But once this information has been disclosed, that aspect of the doctor's
expert function has been performed. The weighing of these risks against
the individual subjective fears and hopes of the patient is not an expert
skill. Such evaluation and decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved to
the patient alone.
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The autonomy guaranteed to the patient in regard to the treatment
decision is not, however, guaranteed him in regard to the disclosure
decision. Nearly all jurisdictions adopting the informed consent the-
ory have also accepted what I refer to herein as the therapeutic justifi-
cation for nondisclosure: if the physician reasonably believes that the
disclosure itself may be harmful to the patient, for example, by induc-
ing a heart attack or impairing the patient's response to treatment, the
physician is excused from his duty of disclosure.7 The patient is ac-
corded no right to evaluate the risks and benefits of disclosure and
nondisclosure within the context of his own value system, nor may he
disagree with the physician's expert determination.
The incursion upon self-determination is magnified by the fact that
the patient does not even know that a decision to withhold has been
made, and thus makes a treatment decision believing it to be based on
all material information when in fact it is not. Consequently, the
treatment decision is also tainted where the physician has exercised
the authority to determine that information should be withheld on
therapeutic grounds.
This Article will examine the therapeutic justification for nondis-
closure to determine whether this transfer of decision making power
from the patient to the physician is justified by the potential threat to
the patient's health. The primary judicial approaches to informed
consent will be discussed and the role of the therapeutic justification
within each approach explained. The rules adopted to implement the
therapeutic justification are in some instances broader than necessary
in order to implement their objective. Refinements on the rules that
could eliminate the overbreadth problem will be noted. Regardless of
such refinements, however, the validity of the therapeutic justification
is questionable on both medical and legal grounds. The theory will be
examined first from the medical perspective to demonstrate that the
medical profession lacks the expertise to predict whether disclosure of
certain information to a particular patient will have positive, negative,
or no therapeutic effect. In the absence of professional expertise,
there is no justification for shifting decision making authority to the
physician. The legal basis for discounting a patient's autonomy in or-
der to protect his health will then be explored, revealing that this ap-
proach represents a deviation from the legal norm of protecting
autonomy at the expense of health, and may even implicate the pa-
tient's constitutional right of privacy. Finally, it will be recognized
that protection of the patient's right to decide whether to receive po-
tentially harmful information presents unique pratical difficulties.
Procedures protective of patients who would choose nondisclosure as
Id. at 242-43, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14.
7. See III PREsmIEN's COmm'N, supra note 1, at 201, 206-44.
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well as those who would choose disclosure will be proposed and
analyzed.
II. THERAPEUTIC NONDISCLOSURES IN CURRENT LAW
A. The Professional Standard
The majority of courts and legislatures adopting the doctrine of in-
formed consent use a "professional" standard to determine the extent
of the required disclosures.8 The professional standard measures the
duty to disclose by the standards of one's professional colleagues,
rather than those of the non-medical community. If the physician re-
vealed information that would be disclosed by a reasonable medical
practitioner under similar circumstances, it is immaterial that the pa-
tient would have wanted to know more before making the treatment
decision; the physician has performed his legal duty. This concept of
the physician's duty is borrowed from malpractice law, in which the
physician's conduct of diagnosis or treatment is measured against the
standards of his colleagues and not the expectations of the general
public.9 The justification for judging a physician according to profes-
sional standards rather than the "reasonable person" test normally
used to determine when there has been a breach of duty lies in the
physician's expertise 0 and fiduciary relationship to the patient.1 '
These factors cause the physician to be held to a standard of conduct
higher than that applicable to the layman.12
Unlike the professional standard for treatment, however, the pro-
fessional standard concerning disclosure is often considered a lower
standard of care than that which might be expected of the reasonable
person. The professional standard may indeed call for disclosure of
less information than laymen feel patients should recieve, but the phy-
sician's expertise itself offers a justification for the lesser disclosure.
Whereas an injured person and a layman who is proposing to adminis-
ter medical assistance might fully discuss alternatives, a physician in a
similar position might limit full discussion because complete disclo-
sure could harm the patient. The physician, when he discloses less
8. Id. at 206-45 (providing a summary of the law of each state on informed consent).
9. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 185-97.
10. Id. at 185, 189.
11. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The patient's
reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted
obligations beyond those associated with arms-length transactions."); Emmett v.
Eastern Dispensary & Casualty Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (finding
"in the fiducial qualities of [the physician-patient] relationship the physician's
duty to reveal to the patient that which in his best interests it is important that he
should know."); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 403-04, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101-02
(1960); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 282, 522 P.2d 852, 860 (1974).
12. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 64:721
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than would the layman, is following the higher standards of his profes-
sion as mandated by his expertise.13
Judicial deference to the physician's expertise in determining what
form and extent of disclosure is most compatible with the patient's
health underlies the therapeutic justification for nondisclosure.14 It
provides the only viable rationale for basing the disclosure duty on
professional practices rather than lay expectations.15 Cases recogniz-
ing a cause of action based on informed consent typically begin with a
statement venerating the patient's right to self-determination, 16 such
as Justice Cardozo's eloquent language in Schloendorff v. Society of
the New York Hospital: "Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body
.... "17 This right is now generally recognized to encompass a pa-
tient's intelligent choice of whether to submit to medical procedures, a
choice that can only be made after all necessary information is pro-
vided by the physician.' 8 A physician's failure to share with the pa-
13. The perception that a professional standard begets a lesser degree of disclosure
also derives from confusion concerning the alternative to the professional stan-
dard. The alternative generally advanced by opponents of the professional stan-
dard is not what a reasonable (non-expert) person rendering medical treatment
would do, but rather what a reasonable patient would have the trained practi-
tioner do. Thus, the question is not simply what the reasonable person adminis-
tering care would do, but who should determine the standard of conduct.
Naturally, those who are potential victims of torts tend to set stricter rules of
conduct than do the potential tortfeasors.
14. The therapeutic justification appears in cases advocating both the professional
standard, e.g., Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188, 197, 473 P.2d 116,121 (1970); Wilson
v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967) (quoting Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W. 2d 688,
674 (Mo. 1965)); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12,25-26,
499 P.2d 1,10 (1972); and the patient oriented (materiality) standard. See Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,502 P.2d 1, 12,104 Cal. Rptr. 505,516 (1972); Percle v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289, 1299 (La. App. 1977); Sard v. Hardy, 281
Md. 432, 444-45, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (1977). Differences exist, however, as to the
extent of nondisclosure that can be justified on this basis. Compare, e.g., Canter-
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (physician may not remain silent
to prevent patient's rejection of proposed therapy), with Thomas v. Berrios, 348
So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medi-
cal Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 25-26, 497 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1972)) (physician need not risk
frightening patient out of therapy that "sound medical judgment dictates the pa-
tient should undertake").
15. The expectations of the public form an important basis for tort law, see PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 3, at 18-19, 21, as well as other areas of law. See, e.g., Pat-
terson, Property Rights in the Balance - The Burger Court and Constitutional
Property, 43 MD. L. REv. 518, 526-30 (1984).
16. E.g., Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 91 (Me. 1974); Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d
690, 695 (S.C. App. 1984).
17. 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
18. E.g., Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1128-29 (Me. 1980); Sard v. Hardy, 281
Md. 432, 438-39, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019 (1977); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 301
(Tex. 1967). Although it may have been accepted at one time that a person who
walks through the door of a doctor's office is voluntarily submitting to whatever
1985]
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tient facts material to the decision1 9 impairs this right to self-
determination, distorting the patient's decision by causing it to be
based on incomplete information. The computer-age expression, "gar-
bage in, garbage out," describes aptly the caliber of the patient's deci-
sion making process in such circumstances.
Those courts that have adopted the professional standard have gen-
erally supported their decision to diverge from the general rule of self-
determination by citing the therapeutic aspect of disclosure.20 The
original informed consent case, Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univer-
sity Board of Trustees,2 1 did not discuss competing standards of care,
but its language tends to support a therapeutically based professional
standard and has been quoted by courts adopting that standard.22 The
procedures the doctor might implement, that view no longer has widespread
support.
19. Even where a broad disclosure duty is recognized, that duty is limited to material
risks, defined as risks to which "a reasonable person, in what the physician knows
or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance
... in deciding whether or not to forego proposed therapy." Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
20. Some courts adopting the professional standard appear to have done so simply
through ignorance of the different roles played by medical expertise in determin-
ing whether a physician has violated the duty to use due care in diagnosis and
treatment, and in determining whether a physician has violated the duty to dis-
close information in aid of the patient's right of self determination. Viewing in-
formed consent merely as a new type of malpractice, they have applied rules used
in determining malpractice claims, including the professional standard. Thus,
these courts have seen no need to justify adoption of the professional standard.
A few courts have justified reliance on professional expertise by citing the
need for specialized knowledge in determining such factual matters as the exist-
ence of risks or alternatives, and the likelihood that any particular risk will mate-
rialize. These courts confuse two separate aspects of risk analysis: the factual
determination that risk exists, and the policy determination that risk should be
assumed. See, e.g., Durenberger, Too Much Emphasis on Risk Assessment? Too
Little on Risk Management?, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM, Mar. 1984, at 3;
Moolenaar, Components of a National Cancer Policy: Science and Regulation,
THE ENviRONMENTAL FORUM, Nov. 1983, at 24. While the physician's expertise is
crucial to the factual determination, it is not central to the policy decision, which
must be based on the patient's values and lifestyle as well as the medical risks and
probabilities. The process for making treatment choices should replicate the 2-
step risk-management process often used in government decision making: assess-
ment of the nature and magnitude of risk by experts, and choice of whether the
risk is "acceptable" (risk-benefit analysis) by government policy-makers. See
EPA Background Paper Outlining Risk Assessment Rationale, Regulatory Plan
for Controlling Benzene Under Clean Air Act, 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 34, at
1484, 1486 (Dec. 23, 1983). See generally E. CROUCH & R. WILSON, RIsK/BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (1982).
21. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). This was the first case to use the term
"informed consent." See id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
22. E.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960). See also
Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 191, 473 P.2d 116, 119 (1970) (citing but not quot-
ing Salgo); Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chem. Works, 381 S.W.2d 563, 567 (1964) (quoting
Salgo but without citation thereto).
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court begins by endorsing, in broad language, the patient's right to
self-determination:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if
he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent
consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise, the physician
may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure or operation in order to
induce his patient's consent.2 3
However, the court then retreats from this ringing endorsement of pa-
tient autonomy on the grounds that disclosure of all such facts might
be bad therapy:
At the same time, the physician must place the welfare of his patients above
all else and this very fact places him in a position in which he sometimes must
choose between two alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the
patient every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no mat-
ter how remote; this may well result in alarming a patient who is already un-
duly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to undertake surgery in
which there is in fact minimal risk; it may also result in actually increasing
the risks by reason of the physiological results of the apprehension itself. The
other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, that the
patient's mental and emotional condition is important and in certain cases
may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of
discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts neces-
sary to an informed consent. 4
Another case often quoted by courts adopting the professional
standard, Aiken v. C/ary,25 again illustrates the therapeutic basis of
that standard:
The question is not what, regarding the risks involved, the juror would relate
to the patient under the same or similar circumstances, or even what a reason-
able man would relate, but what a reasonable medical practitioner would do.
Such practitioner would consider the state of the patient's health, the condi-
tion of his heart and nervous system, his mental state, and would take into
account, among other things, whether the risks involved were mere remote
possibilities or something which occurred with some sort of frequency or regu-
larity. This determination involves medical judgment as to whether disclo-
sure of possible risks may have such an adverse effect on the patient as to
jeopardize success of the proposed therapy, no matter how expertly per-
formed .... After a consideration of these and other proper factors, a rea-
sonable medical practitioner, under some circumstances, would make full
disclosure of all risks which had any reasonable likelihood of occurring, but in
others the facts and circumstances would dictate a guarded or limited disclo-
sure. In some cases the judgment would be less difficult than in others, but, in
any event, it would be a medical judgment.
2 6
23. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317
P.2d 170, 181 (1957).
24. Id. This language, as well as that accompanying footnote 23, was adapted verba-
tim from an amicus brief submitted by the American College of Surgeons. J.
KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DocTOR AND PATENT 60 (1984). Thus the language
was certainly intended to be consistent with a professional standard.
25. 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
26. Id. at 674-75. This language has been quoted in, e.g., Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d
690, 697 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967).
1985]
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The Salgo court's concluding statement illustrates particularly well
the ambivalence concerning medical disclosures that is shared by
courts adopting both the professional and materiality standards. The
two principles-that patients have the right to determine their own
fate, and that the knowledge of risks or uncertainties may be injurious
to the patient-are inherently incompatible in the context of an indi-
vidual treatment decision.2 7 Thus courts accepting both principles
either seek compromise28 or shift the decision on how to compromise
to some other authority, such as the medical profession. The profes-
sional standard embodies the latter approach.
There are two primary problems with shifting the decision to the
medical profession. First, physicians are trained to concern them-
selves with patients' health, not their autonomy. 29 In balancing the
two principles, then, physicians will tend to give disproportionate
weight to the possiblity that disclosure will harm the patient's health
or affect adversely the success of the treatment.30 Further, as several
courts have noted, the lack of attention to patient autonomy in medi-
cal training and discourse means that the balance between autonomy
and health in any given situation results from a spontaneous, ad hoc
assessment by the individual physician rather than the considered
opinion of the medical community. 31 The California Supreme Court,
27. See generally Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 403, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101 (1960)
(expressing concern with "the problem of disclosure involving on one hand the
right of the patient to decide for himself and on the other a possible therapeutic
ground for withholding information which may create tension by depressing or
exciting the patient").
28. For instance, a materiality standard with a therapeutic privilege. See infra notes
43-51 and accompanying text. See also Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 397, 424
P.2d 488, 494-95 (1967) (where physician makes no disclosure, no expert testi-
mony necessary to show that he failed in his duty; where he discloses some infor-
mation, expert testimony is necessary to show the inadequacy of the disclosure);
Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 702 (Minn. 1977) (liability if physician fails
to meet either professional or materiality standard); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.40 (West 1977) (physician must disclose risks of death, brain damage,
quadriplegia, paraplegia, loss or loss of function of any organ or limb, or disfig-
uring scars, but no others).
29. See infra note 212. Cf. Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 239, 523 P.2d 211, 218
(1974) ("the approach of the doctor to the patient's problem is, and should be,
primarily a medical approach, while the patient's approach is personal ....").
30. Indeed, courts themselves seem to give disproportionate weight to the medical
aspects of a patient's well-being, as illustrated by the following statement of the
North Carolina Supreme Court: "The doctor's primary duty is to do what is best
for the patient. Any conflict between this duty and that of a frightening disclo-
sure ordinarily should be resolved in favor of the primary duty." Watson v.
Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 159, 136 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1964), quoted in Grosjean v. Spencer,
258 Iowa 685, 694, 140 N.W.2d 139, 145 (1966).
31. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Percle v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289, 1297 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that
all the expert testimony in the case agreed with the insured doctor that "inform-
ing the patient of risks attending the treatment is a matter entirely within the
[Vol. 64:721
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in rejecting the professional standard, expressed its concern that the
medical community standard regarding disclosure, if there is one at
all, "appears so nebulous that doctors become, in effect, vested with
virtual absolute discretion."3 2 The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, also rejecting the professional stan-
dard, noted in Canterbury v. Spence the danger that courts might in-
terpret no custom at all as an affirmative custom to maintain silence.33
Thus, effective implementation of the professional standard, and its
goal of effecting the autonomy-health balance through the medical
community itself, is impeded by the profession's lack of training and
inclination to carry out this task. This problem, of course, is inherent
in the professional standard regardless of how it is framed or applied
by the courts or legislatures.3 4
The second problem with the professional standard arises from its
overbroad application as compared to its narrow justification. In ap-
plying the professional standard, courts most often frame the determi-
native question in terms of whether it is community medical practice
to advise a patient for whom treatment A is proposed about the risk of
complication X.35 Yet the answer to this question has little bearing on
whether the particular nondisclosure involved in the case was justified
on medical grounds. There could be numerous reasons why physicians
in the community do not disclose risk X to patients receiving treat-
ment A, including lack of time, tradition, physicians' discomfort with
death, the uncertainties of their profession, laziness, or ego.36 More-
judgment of the doctor in each individual case"); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 442,
379 A.2d 1014, 1021 (1977).
32. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513-14 (1972).
33. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
34. Legislatures in a few states have tried to force the medical community to reach
considered decisions on the disclosure obligation by establishing panels of experts
to set disclosure standards. In Hawaii this is to be done by the board of medical
examiners. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 671-3 (Supp. 1984). Texas set up a separate
Medical Disclosure Panel consisting of three lawyers and six medical practition-
ers. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.03 (Vernon Supp. 1984). The inclu-
sion of lawyers indicates that the legislature recognized the non-medical element
of these determinations.
35. For instance, in DiFillippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 550, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (1961),
the court upheld a verdict for defendant physician under the professional stan-
dard on the basis that "all the expert medical testimony agreed that it was not the
practice of surgeons in the Wilmington area to warn patients of the possibility of
resultant injury to the recurrent laryngeal nerves from a thyroidectomy." See
also Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357, 359, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (1971) (uphold-
ing verdict for defendant who had proved "that it was not the standard in the
community to inform patients of the possible complications following surgery").
36. See J. KATz, supra note 24, at 18-19; I PRESmENT's COuu'N, supra note 1, at 85.
Physicians traditionally have regarded it as their prerogative to refrain from dis-
closing information concerning risks, alternatives, and the uncertainties inherent
in medical science. See, eg., J. KATz, supra note 24, at 1-29. Noted medical
ethicist Robert Veatch states that:
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over, the therapeutic justification for nondisclosure is an unlikely ex-
planation for the communitywide failure to disclose risk X, since the
determination of therapeutic impact is necessarily an individualized
one. It requires consideration of such factors as "the state of the pa-
tient's health, the condition of his heart and nervous system, his
mental state."37 In order to be relevant, expert testimony must focus
on the subjective situation of the particular patient.3 8 A hypothetical
question should be posed, in which the expert would be asked to state
whether disclosure to a patient with the physical and mental charac-
teristics shown to have been possessed by the plaintiff at the relevant
time was medically contraindicated. If the answer is no, then it is ir-
relevant that a risk is not normally disclosed by physicians because of
time constraints, tradition, or any other reason.
Thus, a question framed in terms simply of whether physicians rec-
ommending treatment A normally disclose complication X is inher-
ently irrevelent because such a generalized inquiry cannot elicit the
professional response to the therapeutic needs of a particular patient.
Since derogation of the patient's fundamental right of self-determina-
Never in the history of professionally articulated ethics had there ever
been any acknowledgement of the patient as a dignified agent free to
participate in and exercise self-determination over medical decisions.
Not in the Hippocratic Oath, not in the prayer of Maimonides, not in
Percival's ethics, the Codes of the AMA or the World Medical
Association.
Veatch, Autonomy's Temporary Triumph, THE HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984,
at 38. See also I PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 96-98 (reporting results of
Harris poll of current physician attitudes toward withholding information). In
Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357, 359, 492 P.2d 862, 863 (1971), the physician
defended against an informed consent claim by asserting that "it was not the
standard in the community to inform patients of the possible complications fol-
lowing surgery." This view is still prevalent in medical theory and practice. Katz
describes the case of a 21 year old patient with breast cancer who agreed, upon
recommendation of her physician, to a mastectomy with the extent to be deter-
mined by what her physician discovered during the operation. Upon further re-
flection, the physician on the eve of surgery decided to tell the patient that
although he believed surgery to be the treatment of choice, there were alterna-
tives of which she should be aware. She ultimately chose one of these-limited
surgery combined with radiation therapy-in order to avoid the physical mutila-
tion of extensive surgery. The treatment apparently was successful. When this
case was presented at a panel discussion on the treatment of breast cancer, the
physician was roundly criticized by his colleagues. Although the participating
physicians disagreed on the preferred therapy in such a case, they were united on
one proposition: "It is irrational to allow patients to make these decisions." J.
KATz, supra note 24, at 90-91.
37. Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965).
38. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The defendant physician
in Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1967), recognized as much when he
testified that the extent of disclosure "is a medical judgment which includes dis-
cretion and an evaluation of scientific and medical data as well as the patient
himsef." (emphasis added).
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tion by the medical profession is justified solely by the therapeutic as-
pects of nondisclosure, the authority of the medical profession to set
its own disclosure standards and the scope of expert testimony must
be strictly limited. Otherwise, the medical community is given the
power to usurp the autonomy of patients on grounds that have nothing
to do with professional expertise, and that may be as legally unaccept-
able as mere professional habit or the preservation of professional
power. 39 "There is... no basis for operation of the special medical
standard where the physician's activity does not bring his medical
knowledge and skills peculiarly into play."40
If the professional standard were circumscribed by limiting the
medical profession's ability to establish and impose disclosure stan-
dards based on irrelevant factors, much of the criticism of the profes-
sional standard would be muted. Problems would still arise from the
lack of training and collaborative determination concerning the thera-
peutic risks of disclosure. However, critics primarily concerned with
the "virtually absolute discretion" vested in the medical community41
could take comfort in the limitation of such discretion to matters con-
cerning the therapeutic impact of disclosure.42
B. The Materiality Standard
Courts expressing concern about the amount of discretion vested in
the medical profession by the professional standard have themselves
been quite willing to vest discretion in the medical community regard-
ing therapeutically contraindicated disclosures. Canterbury v. Spence
required the physician to disclose all risks and alternatives to which a
reasonable person in what the physician knows or should know to be
the patient's position would attach significance in deciding whether to
undergo the proposed treatment, regardless of the disclosure practices
of his colleagues.4 3 However, it also established what is known as the
therapeutic privilege, recognizing the physician's discretion to withold
information where "risk-disclosure poses such a threat of detriment to
39. Concerning the medical profession's continuing attempts to consolidate and
maintain power, see generally P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION oF AMER.
ICAN MEDICINE 24-29 (1982).
A government entity, of course, is not allowed to usurp individual autonomy
on such flimsy grounds, even when no fundamental right is implicated. The due
process clause requires that laws have a reasonable relation to a legitimate gov-
ernment objective. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd& of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1973); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Thus, courts and legislatures
should not be allowed to delegate to the medical profession the power to destroy
individual autonomy on grounds that have no proper relation to a legitimate
objective.
40. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
41. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 442, 379 A.2d 1014, 1021 (1977).
42. But see infra notes 79-163 and accompanying text.
43. 464 F.2d 772, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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the patient as to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical
point of view." 44 The court's justification of such a privilege mimics
the justification for the professional standard seen in cases such as
Aiken v. Clary,45 and Campbell v. Oliva.46 In Campbell, for example,
the court stated that "it is recognized that patients occasionally be-
come so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a
rational decision, or complicate or hinder the treatment, or perhaps
even pose psychological damage to the patient."47 Indeed, the Canter-
bury court cites Salgo as support for the therapeutic privilege, 48 the
same case relied upon by courts adopting the professional standard
that Canterbury rejects. 4
9
The example of the Canterbury court, in creating a therapeutic ex-
ception to its autonomy-oriented materiality standard, has been fol-
lowed by most other courts5 o and legislatures adopting that
standard.51 The primary arguments between these jurisdictions and
those following the professional standard concern the amount of dis-
cretion to be accorded to the profession and the allocation of the bur-
den of proof. If courts operating under the professional standard
limited the testimony of medical experts to the therapeutic aspects of
disclosure, as the justification for the standard indicates they should,
there would be no disagreement between the two sets of jurisdictions
on the first point. Their quarrel would then be reduced to a matter of
allocating the burden of proof on the issue of the therapeutic impact of
disclosure.
Theoretically, the professional standard, in requiring the plaintiff
to prove that nondisclosure varies from community standards of medi-
cal practice, requires the plaintiff-patient to prove that disclosure was
not medically contraindicated.52 Courts adopting the materiality stan-
dard, on the other hand, accept therapeutic considerations only as a
44. Id. at 789. The question might be raised whether the physician's role in withhold-
ing potentially harmful information partakes more of discretion or duty. If the
latter, then conceivably a patient who could establish a causal link between some
detriment suffered by him and a disclosure made by the physician could recover
in an action for malpractice. Cf. Kraus v. Spielberg, 37 Misc. 2d 519, 236 N.Y.S.2d
143 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (rejection of claim for psychological injury arising from incor-
rect diagnosis in absence of "gross negligence").
45. 396 S.W.2d 668, 674-75 (Mo. 1965).
46. 424 F.2d 1244, 1251 (6th Cir. 1970).
47. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
48. Id. (citing Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560,
578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957).
49. See cases cited supra note 28.
50. E.g., Gerety v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396, 410-11, 589 P.2d 180, 194-95 (1978); Scaria v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 227 N.W.2d 647, 653 (1975).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.103 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
52. This allocation of the burden is expressly acknowledged in some states. E.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2614 (Supp. 1983). See Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690,
703 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Bly v. Rhoads, 222 S.E.2d 783, 788 (Va. 1976).
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defense.53 The Canterbury court justified the latter position on the
judicial policy allocating the burden to a party "who seeks shelter
from an exception to a general rule and who is more likely to have
possession of the facts."54 Under the materiality standard, the in-
formed consent plaintiff has made out a prima facie case before the
issue of privilege is reached.55 Consequently the physician, who has
primary access to the evidence on that issue, bears the burden of prov-
ing a therapeutic justification for the failure to disclose. The compara-
tive ability of the parties to present evidence on the issue of
therapeutic effects is all the more disparate because of the difficulty of
securing physicians willing to testify against their colleagues, the so-
called "conspiracy of silence."56
A further reason for allocating the burden of proof to the physician
is advanced by moral philosophers.57 They stress that a therapeutic
nondisclosure, regardless of the beneficent motivations that underlie
it, is a form of deception; usually a misrepresentation by silence, but
sometimes an actual falsehood.58 In all cases, the privilege contem-
plates a deliberate effort to mislead. Both philosophy59 and law60 rec-
ognize truth as the norm for relations among persons. This should
certainly be so where the relationship partakes of fiduciary qualities,
as is often said of the doctor-patient relationship.61 Where a deviation
53. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Scott v. Bradford,
606 P.2d 554,558 (Okla. 1979); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230,238, 523 P.2d 211,
217 (1974). Contra Getchell v. Mansfield, 489 P.2d 953 (1971) (requiring plaintiff
to establish with expert testimony that he could have been informed of the risks
without detriment to his well being).
54. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
55. Id.
56. See id. at 792 n.124.
57. S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 251-55 (1979); J.
CHmDREss, WHO SHOuLD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE 127-33 (1982)
(on the physician's duty of veracity).
58. A physician may omit to mention a risk or alternative, or on the other hand, he
may offer reassurances to the patient that deny the presence of risk or uncertain
outcome. See, eg., Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 692, 140 N.W.2d 139, 144
(1966) (physician assured patient that "the operation did not amount to much,
plaintiff would be home for a visit at Christmas and be back to work in two or
three weeks").
59. S. Box, supra note 57, at 34-59. Saint Augustine observed: "When regard for
truth has been broken down or even slightly weakened, all things will remain
doubtful... ." St. Augustine, Lying, in TREATISES ON VARIOUs SuJECTs 78 (R.
Deferrari ed. 1952).
60. Legal recognition of the importance of truth in human relations is implicit in
areas of the common law such as libel and slander, fraud, misrepresentation, false
pretenses, and larceny by trick, as well as many modern statutes protecting con-
sumaers, stockholders, and other segments of the public against deceptive
practices.
61. See supra note 11.
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from this norm takes place, it is for the deviator to justify the
deception:
Concealment, evasion, withholding of information may at times be necessary.
But if someone contemplates lying to a patient or concealing the truth, the
burden of proof must shift. It must rest, here, as with all deception, on those
who advocate it in any one instance .... A decision to deceive must be seen
as a very unusual step .... 62
The requirement that deception be justified by the actor is reflected in
a general sense in the Canterbury court's statement that one who
seeks shelter from an exception to a general rule bears the burden of
proof, though the statement frames the idea in a procedural rather
than a moral tone.
The arguments of those placing the burden on the physician are
persuasive. Indeed, they are so persuasive that some of the jurisdic-
tions following the professional standard have in a display of logical
perversity expressly adopted the "therapeutic privilege" as a de-
fense.63 Thus, although the practical effects of either the professional
standard or the materiality standard may vary considerably, theoreti-
cally they are not always that far apart. Most importantly, nearly all
jurisdictions accept some form of the therapeutic justification for
nondisclosure.
III. THE MEDICAL VALIDITY OF THE THERAPEUTIC
JUSTIFICATION
Most courts accepting the therapeutic justification have done so in
dicta, describing the circumstances encompassed within the justifica-
tion in general terms such as where disclosure "would be likely to
bring about harmful results,"64 or "would be detrimental to the pa-
tient's well-being."65 Statutory delineations are similarly vague.
Alaska, for example, provides that information may be withheld
where "the health care provider reasonably believed that a full disclo-
sure would have a substantially adverse effect on the patient's condi-
tion."66 Such language could encompass a variety of projected effects
on the patient, from heart attack to refusal of the proferred treatment.
62. S. BOK, supra note 57, at 252. Accord J. CHILDRESS, supra note 57, at 132 (viola-
tion of the duty of veracity requires justification).
63. E.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d (McKinney 1977). This posture implicitly
mandates that the community standard on which the plaintiff is required to pres-
ent evidence is a standard based on nontherapeutic considerations, and hence di-
vorced from the justification for adopting the professional standard initially.
64. DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 549, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (1961).
65. Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or. 174, 181, 489 P.2d 953, 956 (1971).
66. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556(b)(4) (1983).
[Vol. 64:721
THERAPEUTIC JUSTIFICATION
A. The Concept of Harm
In order to assess the appropriate scope of the therapeutic justifica-
tion in the law of informed consent, it is first necessary to determine
which of the potential effects of disclosure can be validly categorized
as "harm." The difficulty in defining harm is particularly evident
where the effect sought to be avoided by disclosure is patient anxiety,
the problem most often cited by the courts when applying the ther-
apetuic justifiction. In Patrick v. SedwiCk,67 for instance, the court ac-
cepted the physician's therapeutic justification for nondisclosure,
stating: "[d]octors frequently tailor the extent of their preoperative
warnings to the particular patient to avoid the unnecessary anxiety
and apprehension which such appraisal might arouse in the mind of
the patient. 6 8 The Patrick court, and others reaching similar conclu-
sions, 6 9 appear to accept anxiety per se as a prospective harm suffi-
cient to justify withholding risk information.
67. 391 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1964).
68. Id. at 458. In Patrick, plaintiff challenged her physician's failure to warn her of
the risk of vocal chord paralysis and consequent loss of voice following a tracheot-
omy. According to testimony, the only risk information communicated to plain-
tiff was that the operation would be "nothing more than a tonsillectomy." Id. at
458. The defendant physician relied upon the therapeutic justification to explain
the omission of risk information, stating that his decision whether to communi-
cate risk information depended on the "disposition and psychological makeup of
the patient." Id. His determination not to inform the plaintiff was based upon
conversations with the referring physician, whose chart notes indicated that
plaintiff was "a nervous and apprehensive person." Id. The defendant physi-
cian's approach to disclosure was supported by the referring physician and an-
other testifying physician. The referring physician testified that he followed no
general rule, but "placed the nature of the discussion of risks upon the stability
and comprehension of the particular patient." The other physician testified "that
it was his practice not to unduly alarm his patient when discussing proposed sur-
gical procedures with him." M
69. In Tatro v. Lueken, 212 Kan. 606, 512 P.2d 529 (1973), for instance, the court
accepted the following explanation by the physician of his failure to disclose the
risk of vesicovaginal fistula in a hysterectomy:
If I scared the patient prior to surgery that she may die or have serious
complications, I probably would do undue harm to her emotional make-
up. It's already serious enough somebody has to go to a hospital for this
length of time and find herself minus the female structures afterwards.
Id. at 616, 512 P.2d at 537. In Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962),
the physician's failure to warn a patient of a risk of injury to the recurrent laryn-
geal nerves during a thyroidectomy was excused by the court on similar grounds:
Doctors frequently tailor the extent of their pre-operative warnings to
the particular patient, and with this I can find no fault. Not only is much
of the risk of a technical nature beyond the patient's understanding, but
the anxiety, apprehension, and fear generated by a full disclosure
thereof may have a very detrimental effect on some patients. In this case
the defendant told the patient, among other things, that the operation
would be similar to the one she had undergone in 1954. In view of the
patient's emotional state and her concern over this operation as well as a
gynecological operation to be performed at the same time, in addition to
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Certainly anxiety is an unpleasant sensation, and one that is likely
to result from the disclosure of risks involved in a recommended medi-
cal procedure. A study conducted at the clinical center of the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) found that most patients felt "anxious, dis-
turbed, or even shocked when the informed consent procedure pro-
duced unfavorable news about their disease."7o In another study of
gynecologic surgery patients, 25 percent of those receiving a detailed
disclosure of eight rare but serious complications associated with anes-
thesia reported that they had been "frightened" by the discussion.71
Thus, a feeling of anxiety is a prevalent result of disclosure, 72 and one
often cited by physicians as a "harm" justifying the withholding of un-
favorable information.
Studies also have revealed, however, a marked difference in the
perception of anxiety between physicians and patients. The NIH
study found that although disclosure caused anxiety in most patients,
"these patients and their families regarded the unpleasant feelings as
appropriate for their situation, and they did not equate receiving bad
news and feeling disturbed with being harmed. The same distinction
is not made by many physicians .... ,73 Similar findings emerged in
a study of patient preferences regarding disclosure of drug-related
risks and alternatives. Patients and physicians were asked whether
physicians should disclose information that they believed would make
the patient "very upset and anxious." While about 20 percent of the
physicians favored withholding information under such circum-
having previously experienced a thyroidectomy, I am of the opinion the
patient was properly advised of the seriousness of the operation.
Id. at 583.
70. Boverman, Mental Health Aspects of the Informed Consent Process, 128 PROGRESS
IN CLINIcAL & BIoLoGIcAL RESEARCH 229, 232 (K. Berg & K. Tranoy eds. 1983).
71. Lankton, Batchelder & Ominsky, Emotional Responses to Detailed Risk Disclo-
sure for Anesthesia, a Prospective Randomized Study, 46 ANESTHESIOLOGY 294,
295 (1977).
72. A Hospital Stress Rating Scale developed by several physicians to measure the
stress caused by hospitalization listed as significant stressors: "thinking you may
lose your sight"; "thinking you might lose your hearing"; "thinking you may have
pain because of surgery or test procedures"; "thinking your appearance might be
changed after your hospitalization"; and "thinking you might lose a kidney or
some other organ." Volicer, Isenberg & Burns, Medical-Surgical Differences in
Hospital Stress Factors, 3 J. HUMAN STRESS 3, 7 (1977). Physicians' disclosure of
risks and uncertainties are only one source of such thoughts. Another possible
source is patient speculation due to physicians' failure to provide complete infor-
mation. See infra text accompanying notes 119-21.
73. Boverman, supra note 70, at 232. The professional opposition to anxiety-produc-
ing disclosures has been attributed to physicians' desire to avoid situations that
create anxiety for themselves rather than a therapeutically motivated duty to
avoid creating anxiety in patients. The physician may mentally transfer his own
dread of the informed consent discussion to the patient. See J. KATz, supra note
24, at 19; Boverman, supra note 70, at 232, 241.
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stances, not one of the patients regarded withholding as appropriate. 74
Thus patients, the parties who would suffer from the anxiety, over-
whelmingly viewed it as insufficient harm to warrant the withholding
of pertinent information. From the patient's perspective, it is not dis-
closure, but withholding of information that constitutes harm.
This analysis demonstrates the vast oversimplification that occurs
when a physician or court concludes that information should be with-
held because disclosure causes harm. It would be as logical to con-
clude that surgery should not be undertaken because it will result in
postoperative pain. Medical practice is an area in which harm is often
inflicted in order to avoid greater harm.75 When the treatment is con-
sidered as a whole, the prospective net benefit justifies the harm or
risk of harm implicit in the procedure. If the harm or risk is so great
that it outweighs the potential benefit, law and professional ethics pro-
hibit performance of the procedure. The permissibility of a given
therapy is thus determined through a cost-benefit analysis. When
nondisclosure is used as a form of therapy, it must be similarly
justified.
The divergence of views between physicians and patients in regard
to anxiety avoidance can be traced to differences in the types of costs
and benefits considered by the two groups. Physicians, trained to fo-
cus on the patient's physical and mental health, see no health risks to
counterbalance the anxiety-avoidance benefits of nondisclosure.
Thus, the cost-benefit analysis points decisively toward withholding
the information. Patients, on the other hand, see costs not included in
the medical formulation: the costs of ignorance and lack of control
over their own lives. To a populace bred on principles of individual-
ism, these are substantial costs indeed and can easily outweigh the
benefit of avoiding feelings of anxiety.76
74. Faden, Becker, Lewis, Freedman & Faden, Disclosure of Information to Patients
in Medical Care, 19 MEDIcAL CARE 718, 726 (1981). A Harris poll commissioned
by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research seems to reach a contrary result. Asked
whether a physician would be justified in withholding information from a patient
under various circumstances, 52 percent of those questioned supported nondisclo-
sure where "the information might make the patient anxious or upset." II PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 142. The difference may reflect the wording of
the question in each survey. The Faden study asked patients about their expecta-
tions of their own physician. The Harris poll, on the other hand, asked persons
who were not necessarily patients themselves how doctors should deal with their
patients. An individual's perspective may very significantly depending on
whether he is the potential recipient of information or a third party.
75. The Hippocratic directive to "do no harm" thus cannot be considered a prohibi-
tion on any act that might cause pain or temporary physical detriment or might
entail risk of permanent physical detriment.
76. See generally N. BowiE & R. SIMON, THE INDIvIDuAL AND THE PoLmicAL ORDER
165 (1977) (defining "harm" as injury to a broad range of interests possessed by
the individual). In their work on risk assessment, Crouch and Wilson calculate
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The patients' perspective must control for purposes of formulating
legal rules. The autonomy values that influenced the patients' out-
come are fundamental to American law,77 and cannot be overlooked in
determining the permissibility of therapeutic nondisclosures. Thus, a
nondisclosure is conceivably permissible only if its therapeutic bene-
fits can outweigh both therapeutic and social (autonomy) costs.
Any weighing of the costs and benefits of nondisclosure will re-
quire consideration of uncertain effects including the possibilities of
cure and risks of harm. When such effects are factored into a cost-
benefit analysis it is necessary to weigh not only their severity but also
the likelihood that they will occur.78 Because of the importance of
autonomy, the justification for nondisclosure must require at a mini-
mum a significant likelihood of a substantial negative effect. At this
juncture, it is useful to examine the state of scientific knowledge con-
cerning negative therapeutic effects of disclosure to identify situa-
tions, if any, in which this standard could be met.
B. Secondary Effects of Anxiety
Some courts have grounded the therapeutic justification not upon
the feeling of anxiety itself, but rather upon the secondary effects of
anxiety on the patient. These courts have accepted nondisclosures
where "psychological damage" 79 or "psychosomatic ramifications"
were threatened.O The one case in which this issue was decisive in-
volved nondisclosure of the risks of aortography (a diagnostic test used
to determine the existence of certain cardiac irregularities) to a pa-
tient with apparent cardiac distress.8 ' One defendant physician
testified:
This man was very well-educated, a fine man, but in addition, he was fright-
ened about his condition, he was apprehensive, and this actually guided our
hand in much of what we did because if a man has a serious heart disease, with
hypertension, and you thereupon frighten him further, you have a problem
which you have created ...
.... I mentioned he had high blood pressure, he had pain in his chest which
risk by a formula that includes probability, severity, and weight. The weight fac-
tor is included "to account for the possibility that in evaluating a problem consist-
ing of many different parts, risks of apparently similar magnitude may be
accorded very different weights in consideration of the totality." E. CROUCH & R.
WILSON, supra note 20, at 10. The deviation in outcome between physicians and
patients is attributable to a difference in weights assigned to particular risks and
benefits as well as to physicians' failure to consider some benefits considered by
patients.
77. See infra notes 178-201 and accompanying text.
78. Risk analysis invariably encompasses assessment of both severity and probability.
See, e.g., E. CROUCH & R. WILSON, supra note 20, at 9-10.
79. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
80. Hales v. Pittman, 118 Ariz. 305, 311 n.4, 576 P.2d 493, 499 n.4 (1978).
81. Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 197, 473 P.2d 116, 121 (1970).
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we were trying to find an answer to, and if I had sat down with Dr. Nishi and
said, "We are about to inject something into you which has a remote chance of
causing you to be paralyzed, you may get an immediate reaction which will
cost you your life," if I had said these things to Dr. Nishi, I think it would have
been a terrible mistake .... 82
The court held this and similar testimony from a codefendant suffi-
cient to establish as the professional standard of disclosure "that a
competent and responsible medical practitioner would not disclose in-
formation which might induce an adverse psychosomatic reaction in a
patient highly apprehensive of his condition."8 3
Had the physicians' testimony been subjected to the kind of prob-
ing cross-examination common to expert testimony concerning profes-
sional standards of treatment, it is far from certain that it could have
stood the test. Although medical evidence of the linkage between
stress and disease is accumulating, there is little precise knowledge of
what types of stress cause what types of disorder in what types of per-
son, nor of the biological processes through which such results occur.
A brief review of some of the gaps and uncertainties in current under-
standing of the relationship between stress and disease will highlight
the problems of using that imponderable relationship as a basis for
legal conclusions.
A plethora of studies in the past twenty years has documented pos-
itive correlations between stress and a wide range of physical and
mental disorders.8 4 Stress has been associated with psychological dis-
orders such as depression and neurosis,8 5 and with physical conditions
including, but by no means limited to, cardiovascular disease,8 6 can-
cer,8 7 peptic ulcer,8 8 bronchial asthma,8 9 juvenile diabetes,90 Crohn's
disease,91 pancreatitis,92 headache,93 and a variety of infectious dis-
82. Id. at 193, 473 P.2d at 120.
83. Id. at 197,473 P.2d at 121. The court held that the burden of proving the standard
of care was satisifed regardless of whether it fell on plaintiff or defendants. Id. at
201, 473 P.2d at 123.
84. Kasl, Stress and Health, 5 ANN. REV. PuB. HEALTH 319, 335 (1984).
85. See Boverman, supra note 70, at 233.
86. Eg., Eliot & Buell, Environmental and Behavioral Influences in the Major Car-
diovascular Disorders, in 1981 PERSPECTIVES ON BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE 25 (S.
Weiss, J. Herd & B. Fox eds.).
87. E.g., Psychosocial Factors and the Immune System in Human Cancer, in 1981
PSYCHONEUROIMMUNOLOGY 103 (R. Ader ed.).
88. E.g., Pflanz, Epidemiological and Socio-cultural Factors in the Etiology of Duode-
nal Ulcer, 6 ADvANcEs IN PsYcHosoMA c MED. 121 (1971).
89. L. BmLimusKAs, STREss AND ITs RELATIONSHmn TO HEALTH AND ILLNEss 65-79
(1982).
90. E.g., Johnson, Psychosocial Factors in Juvenile Diabetes, 3 J. BEHAVIORAL MED.
95 (1979).
91. E.g., Gerbert, Psychological Aspects of Crohn's Disease, 3 J. BEHAVIORAL MED. 41
(1979).
92. Kaplan, Wheeler & Kelly, Stress and Diseases of the Upper Gut- II. Stress and
Pancreatic Disease, 50 MT. SINAI J. MED. 331 (1983).
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eases. 94 In the face of this mounting evidence, there is a certain facial
validity to the judicial conclusion that physicians should be allowed to
refrain from disclosures likely to produce stress and hence illness.
The matter is, however, not nearly that simple.
Stress is not a unitary concept, but has many meanings having ref-
erence to both the environmental stimulus (e.g., disclosure of risk in-
formation) and the bodily response. As described by one recent
commentator:
The term "stress" continues to be used in several fundamentally different
ways: (a) as an environmental condition; (b) as the appraisal of an environ-
mental situation; (c) as a response to the environmental condition or to its
appraisal; (d) as an interactive term indicating the relationship between envi-
ronmental demands and the person's capacity to meet those demands. In ad-
dition to the different ways the term "stress" is used by the different
investigators, there is also lack of consensus, clarity and precision with respect
to each of the specific usages. Thus, for example, stress as an environmental
condition (here the term "stressor" is often used) has no unique defining char-
acteristics that have been agreed upon and that are adequately operationalized
for health studies. Similarly, within the category of stress as a response to an
environmental condition, the field offers no consensus on the unique set of
responses (biological or psychosocial behavioral) that would be criteria for this
definition.
9 5
If nondisclosure is to be based on the facts that disclosure causes stress
and stress causes disease, the same meaning of stress must inhere in
both statements. It is not at all clear that this is the case. A closer
look at the various meanings of stress defined above will illuminate
the intemperance of drawing legal conclusions about disclosure from
the statement that "stress causes illness."
Stress as an environmental condition capable of causing a certain
type of human response (henceforth referred to as a stressor) can re-
fer to a wide range of facts or situations, including unsatisfactory
working conditions,96 bereavement,9 7 unemployment,98 and reloca-
tion.9 9 These conditions affect the individual through the pysche;
93. L. BIELAusKAs, supra note 89, at 65-79.
94. Id. at 81-85. Indeed, some professionals espouse the view that all illness is psycho-
somatic. Gordon, The Paradigm of Holistic Medicine, in 1980 HEALTH FOR THE
WHOLE PERSON 1, 10-11 (A. Hastings, J. Fadiman & J. Gordon eds.).
95. Kasl, supra note 84, at 320. Kasl's article is a review of the medical literature
connecting stress with disease.
96. See generally KAHN, WORK AND HEALTH (1981).
97. See, e.g., Helsing & Szklo, Mortality after Bereavement, 114 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
41 (1981); Klerman & Izen, The Effects of Bereavement and Grief on Physical
Health and Well-Being, 9 ADVANCES IN PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 63 (1977).
98. See, e.g., Brenner & Mooney, Unemployment and Health in the Context of Eco-
nomic Change, 16 SOC. SCIENCE MED. 1125 (1982); Kasl & Cobb, Variability of
Stress Effects Among Men Experiencing Job Loss, in 1982 HANDBOOK OF STRESS
445 (L. Goldberger & S. Breznitz eds.).
99. See, e.g., Kasl & Berkman, Health Consequences of the Experience of Migration, 4
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 69 (1983).
[Vol. 64:721
THERAPEUTIC JUSTIFICATION
awareness and negative assessment precede response.10 0 Other stres-
sors such as surgery, anesthesia,lo' thermal extremes, infections, and
drugs,102 are primarily physical. Thus in some instances in which
stress is said to cause disease, the reference may be to a purely physi-
cal mechanism rather than to one that involves a psychological
assessment.
It seems unlikely that the remaining forms of stress, involving the
individual's appraisal of the stressor and his bodily response to a per-
ceived threat, take the same form for both physical and psychic stres-
sors. It serves no purpose to speculate on that question, however, as
scientists simply do not understand the relationship between percep-
tion of the stressor and bodily response. Nor is lack of knowledge lim-
ited to the difference between physical and psychic stressors. If we
focus on psychic stressors alone, such as a physician's disclosures to a
patient, we find that scientists have only hypotheses of the processes
by which stress produces illness. One current hypothesis postulates
that stress-related illness arises from stress-induced changes in the au-
tonomic nervous system, the "fight or flight" response being an exam-
ple.1 03 Another suggests that the biological stress response involves
an immunosuppressive effect, rendering the body more susceptible to
a wide range of disorders that might otherwise be kept in check by the
immune system.104 Research has largely omitted study of the biologi-
cal stress response, and hence it is not known whether one or both of
these theories provides a full or partial explanation of that
response.105
Nor is the level or duration of stress necessary to produce disease
known.106 Stress is categorized as acute or chronic, the latter refer-
ring to a long-term and more or less continuous condition, and the
former to a more isolated episode. Most of the studies finding a posi-
tive correlation between stress and disease have involved situations of
chronic stress such as working conditions, bereavement, or unemploy-
ment.107 There has, however, been some research indicating that dis-
ease can result from acute stress.1 08 Interestingly, it has been found
that acute and chronic stress risk factors may show opposite associa-
100. The medical community has not, however, ruled out the possibility that the indi-
vidual may respond to those psychological stressors by changes in diet, sleeping or
exercise patterns, or other aspects of lifestyle, and that the latter may be the
intervening cause of the illness. See, e.g., Kasl, supra note 84, at 325, 330, 334.
101. E.g., Kaplan & Wheeler, Stress and Diseases of the Upper Gut I Stress and Liver
Disease, 50 MT. SINAI J. MED. 225, 226 (1983).
102. E.g., Kaplan, Wheeler & Kelly, supra note 92, at 331-32.
103. L. BIELIAUSKAS, supra note 89, at 65-79.
104. Id. at 81-85.
105. Kasl, supra note 84, at 334.
106. See, L. BIEAuSKAs, supra note 89, at 328-334.
107. Id.; Kasl, supra note 84, at 35, 92-93.
108. See Kasl, supra note 84, at 327; Kaplan, Wheeler & Kelly, supra note 92, at 332.
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tions with a particular disease.109 The stress resulting from disclosure
could conceivably fall into either category. For patients undergoing
surgery or others whose treatment will be completed within a rela-
tively short period, most risks will or will not have materialized at the
end of that period, thus terminating the source of stress. The period of
anxiety in such cases would not normally be of sufficient duration to
be classified as chronic stress. On the other hand, a patient requiring
long term medication could potentially experience stress over an ex-
tended period. The frequency of this effect is unknown, however;
studies have found that most patients tend to forget risk information
almost as soon as it is provided to them.110 Lack of information con-
cerning the type of stress produced by disclosure and the relationship
of particular types of stress to particular disease states compounds the
general medical uncertainty regarding the mechanism(s) by which
stress causes disease.
Because the medical profession lacks the theoretical understanding
of how stress produces disease and what type, level, and duration of
stress is capable of doing so, it cannot reliably predict the linkage be-
tween any particular stressor and any given illness in the absence of
an empirical study demonstrating the specific link in question. Thus,
it may be possible to predict the interrelation of heart disease with
Type A behavior because there have been studies of that particular
linkage.1' This does not mean that the correlation of heart disease
with divorce can be predicted in the absence of studies specifically ex-
ploring that relationship. Nor can it be concluded that there is a cor-
109. Kasl, supra note 84, at 327.
110. Roter, Physician/Patient Communication: Transmission of Information and Pa-
tient Effects, 32 MD. STATE MED. J. 260, 262 (1983).
111. E.g., Haynes & Feinleib, Type A Behavior and Incidence of Coronary Heart Dis-
ease in the Framingham Heart Study, 29 ADVANCES IN CARDIOLOGY 85 (1982).
Type A behavior refers to an aggressive, competitive approach to life character-
ized by, e.g., impatience, restlessness, and hard-driving effort. Kasl, supra note
84, at 329. Kasl notes that whereas earlier studies had linked Type A behavior
with coronary disease generally, follow-up studies indicate that the linkage may
only apply to certain population subgroups such as males in white collar jobs. Id.
The authors of a more recent study, showing no relationship between Type A
behavior and complications of coronary disease, state:
Although an extensive literature implicates Type A behavior in the de-
velopment and progression of coronary artery disease, conflicting reports
have begun to appear with increasing frequency .... Thus, there is no
uniform evidence to substantiate either a close relation between the
characteristic behavior of the Type A personality and coronary disease
or the protective effects of the Type B personality.
Case, Heller, Case, Mass & The Multicenter Post-Infarction Research Group,
Type A Behavior and Survival After Acute Myocardial Infarction, 312 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 737, 740 (1985). The debate over Type A and heart disease typifies the
uncertainty that pervades medical knowledge of the physical effects of stress.
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relation between Type A behavior and ulcer without a similar study of
those phenomena.
A conclusion that disclosure of medical information is likely to
cause some disease state in the patient can be justified only by studies
of the incidence of such disease (or perhaps of stress-related disorders
generally) in patients to whom disclosure has been made. 1 2 Yet a
search of recent medical literature reveals no such study. The limited
research on the effects of disclosure goes no further than to demon-
strate that disclosure can cause anxiety.113 Whether it is the type of
anxiety that can cause disease and, if so, the nature of such disease has
not been explored. Thus the therapeutic justification, at least insofar
as it relates to stress-related illness, rests on no firmer ground than
speculation.
It might be argued that conclusions concerning disclosure are in-
ferrable from studies demonstrating the adverse health effects of
other types of anxiety-causing information.1 4 However, disclosure of
medical information is unique in important respects that render such
comparisons inapt. When a physician and patient are discussing treat-
ment options for the patient's malady, a complex of psychological
forces affect the patient, involving his reaction to the original malady,
his relationship to the physician, and his uncertainty about the future.
In this context studies have demonstrated that nondisclosure can itself
be a potent source of anxiety." 5 It has been established that patients
highly value information about their condition and that poor commu-
nication is the most common source of patient dissatisfaction with
112. The therapeutic justification does not necessarily demand that the particular dis-
ease state be identified, though it must fall within a range of disorders sufficiently
serious to justify overriding the patient's autonomy.
113. Boverman, supra note 70; Lankton, supra note 71, at 295, Roter, supra note 110.
114. It is not certain that such studies exist, but we shall assume for the moment that
they do.
115. Roter, supra note 110, at 260. Moreover, some physicians advance positive thera-
peutic effects of disclosure. Studies have demonstrated that fully informed pa-
tients have, for example: less postoperative anxiety, Faden, Becker, Lewis,
Freeman & Faden, Disclosure of Information to Patients in Medical Care, 19
MEDICAL CARE 718, 732 (1981); improved recovery, Roter, supra note 110, at 263-
64; better psychological adjustment following treatment, Boverman, supra note
70, at 238-39; and a better record of complying with doctors' recommendations
concerning medication, lifestyle changes, and other outpatient therapies. S. Box,
supra note 57, at 250; Becker, Lewis, Freedman & Faden, Disclosure of Informa-
tion to Patients in Medical Care, 19 MEDICAL CARE 718, 732 (1981); Roter, supra
note 110, at 263. Although these studies do not necessarily focus on risk as an
item of disclosure, they offer firm evidence of the value of the partnership model
of physician-patient relations that informed consent law seeks to implement. Cf.
I PREsiDENT's COim'N, supra note 1, at 25-26, 29-31. (criticizing the caselaw for
distorting the self-determination goal by placing too much emphasis on disclosure
of specific risks and not enough on overall physician-patient communication and
joint decision making).
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physicians.16
A primary explanation for a link between nondisclosure and stress
is the general human unease with uncertainty:
We are all, to some degree or other, afraid of uncertainty. Because our con-
ception of rationality is grounded in the Mechanistic Paradigm, which has no
place for uncertainty, we find it difficult to be rational about uncertainty. In-
stead, when faced with uncertainty, we become anxious - most of all when our
lives are on the line.1 1 7
The uncertain patient lacks the ability to predict or to control what
happens to him, two factors that consistently generate stress and its
secondary effects.118 Reassurances from his physician may not relieve
the patient's uncertainty because of the widespread belief among pa-
tients that physicians offer words of hope and reassurance regardless
of the prognosis.119
Instead of accepting such reassurances, the patient may speculate
as to the actual risks and benefits of the procedure.12 0 It is not at all
unforeseeable that the speculating patient will imagine difficulties
116. A study of patients' reactions to detailed disclosure of the risks of anesthesia
found no statistically significant difference in the level of preoperative apprehen-
sion between those who had received the detailed disclosure and those who had
not. Lankton, Batchelder & Ominsky, supra note 71, at 295.
117. H. BURSZTAJN, R. FEiNBLOOM, R. HAmm & A. BRODSKY, MEDICAL CHOICES, MEDI-
CAL CHANCES xiv (1981).
118. See L. BIELIAUSKAS, supra note 89, at 54-55.
119. Most patients are aware that drugs, certain diagnostic tests, and in particular hos-
pitalization involve risks. They may be aware of individual cases similar to their
own in which risks have materialized. Indeed, they may even be aware that re-
gardless of the prognosis or risks, physicians will offer hopeful, reassuring state-
ments rather than a true assessment of the situation. Thus, Professor Katz
observes:
Already in the initial encounters with patients, the undiscriminating
expression of hope and reassurance creates doubt in patients and their
families about whether doctors can be trusted. Countless anecdotal ex-
amples attest to patients' deep-seated beliefs that all reassurance may be
just a ploy to hide the truth about the patient's dire condition, even - and
this is a tragic consequence frequently overlooked - when it is a true
assessment of a patient's favorable prognosis. What Richard C. Cabot
said about lying to patients - that a lie cannot be isolated like "a case of
smallpox," but that it spreads "far beyond our intention and our con-
trol," and that it "[begets], as a rule .... a quiet, chronic incredulity
which is stubborn" - also holds true for indiscriminate hope and
reassurance.
J. KATz, supra note 24, at 224. See also id. at 25-26.
120. Cf. L. TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYICH (L. Solotaroff trans. 1981):
Ivan Ilyich suffered most of all from the lie, the lie which, for some rea-
son, everyone accepted: that he was not dying but was simply ill, and that
if he stayed calm and underwent treatment he could expect good results.
Yet he knew that regardless of what was done, all he could expect was
more agonizing suffering and death. And he was tortured by this lie,
tortured by the fact that they refused to acknowledge what he and eve-
ryone else knew, that they wanted to lie about his horrible condition and
to force him to become a party to that lie.
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greater than those that actually exist. Thus, "[t]he attitude that 'what
you don't know won't hurt you' is proving unrealistic; it is what pa-
tients do not know but vaguely suspect that causes them corrosive
worry."121
An additional stressor is the feeling of exclusion engendered in a
patient by an uncommunicative physician or, even worse, a physician
whom the patient believes to be falsely reassuring. Psychiatrists have
noted the loss of self-esteem that results from poor communication,
particularly in a setting that is inherently stressful.122 This effect is
magnified where the lack of communication deprives an individual of
the opportunity to make decisions on matters of vital concern to him.
A patient in this situation tends to feel "isolated, alone, and aban-
doned, even though [he] may try hard to deny such feelings by clinging
to the helpful reassurances that [his] physicians provide."
The context of medical decision making thus involves multiple
stressors, including both disclosure and nondisclosure. An under-
standing of the relationship between subsequent disease states and
various models for handling discussions of treatment options demands
study of that specific subject. In the absence of such research, no
statement on the matter can rise above the level of speculation.
The speculative nature of any determination that nondisclosure is
medically required in a particular therapeutic setting is heightened by
the additional uncertainties in moving from the conclusion that disclo-
sure is a stressor that can cause disease to the more specific conclusion
that this result is likely to occur with a particular patient in a particu-
lar situation. Individual variables may be present at three levels.
First, to what extent will the patient view the disclosure as threaten-
ing?-24 In the studies of patients' reactions to disclosure, not all exper-
ienced anxiety. 25 This may have resulted from some patients'
positive reaction to the fact of disclosure, from personality differences,
or from some other factor. Until it is possible to predict the individual
patient's assessment of the information, the potential for disease can-
not be anticipated, for negative assessment is a necessary first step to
stress-related disease. Secondly, the patient's coping skills must be
Id. at 102-04.
A consistent problem in civil emergency situations (e.g., hurricanes, earth-
quakes), where uncertainty prevails due to failure of normal communication
channels, is rumor control. Rumors (i.e., speculation) seem to arise spontane-
ously to fill the void left by communication breakdown.
121. S. BoK, supra note 57, at 247.
122. Boverman, upra note 70, at 238.
123. J. KATZ, supra note 24, at 217.
124. No stressor is inherently productive of physical or psychological stress reactions.
Such reactions occur only if the individual assesses the stressor as threatening.
See generally, L. BrsuAusKAs, supra note 89, at 25-26, 91-96.
125. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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understood. One reason why anxiety leads to disease in one person
and not in another is the difference in coping skills.126 Coping skills
are often associated with aspects of a patient's life that enhance his
ability to cope with or adjust to stressors, such as interpersonal sup-
port resources.127 Coping skills may also be a facet of individual per-
sonality or psychological make-up.128 Finally, it must be possible to
predict the likelihood that the physical mechanism by which anxiety
leads to disease will occur in the particular patient. Different bodies
react differently to any particular phenomenon. Overindulgence in
cholesterol leads to cardiac distress in some persons, but not others.
Heavy smoking leads to lung cancer in some persons, but not others.
Similarly, the same level of anxiety over the same period of time may
result in disease in some persons but not others, and indeed may result
in different diseases in different persons. Both lifestyle and genetic
factors may be implicated. Criteria for identifying susceptible patients
are necessary if the likelihood of a disease response to anxiety is to be
predicted by a physician.
Each of these three variables contributes to the overall uncertainty
in predicting which patients will suffer stress-related disease as a re-
sult of disclosure. There are a number of facts relevant to this deter-
mination that can be observed or otherwise learned by the physician.
The physician may observe that the patient appears nervous or shows
other signs of anxiety. He can determine whether the patient is faced
with other stressors.129 He can determine whether the patient's pres-
ent disorder is of a type associated with stress or whether the patient
has suffered from such disorders in the past.'3 0 He can identify factors
in the patient's life that have a positive or negative correlation with
coping skills. And he may be aware of the patient's attitude toward
and reaction to medical disclosures in general. Knowledge of these
factors constitutes a minimum for the physician attempting to predict
a patient's reaction. Much of this information is of a type not pos-
sessed by most physicians in this age of industrialized medicine. More-
over, even possession of all these facts cannot assure an accurate
prediction because of the general medical uncertainty concerning the
relationship of stress and disease.
It should be apparent from the above discussion that a significant
likelihood of a substantial negative effect from any disclosure cannot,
126. See L. BIELIAUSKAS, supra note 89, at 27-33, 91-96.
127. See id. at 27-33, 63, 91-96.
128. See id-
129. The cumulative stress load may affect the patient's ability to cope with the disclo-
sure. See L. BIELIAUSKAS, supra note 89, at 7. Of course, all medical patients are
faced with the significant stresses indigenous to illness. Overreliance on this fac-
tor thus could constrict the informed consent doctrine.
130. That a condition is of a type associated with stress does not, however, mean that it
was stress-induced in the particular case.
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as a general rule, be demonstrated in regard to stress-related disor-
ders. It has never been confirmed empirically that disclosure causes
such disorders, nor does the medical community possess sufficient the-
oretical understanding of anxiety and its effects on the body to offer
theoretical justification for such a conclusion. Limited knowledge
about the interaction of disclosure and non-disclosure as anxiety pro-
ducers further impairs the predictive ability of medical professionals,
as does the lack of criteria for associating probability of harm with
particular patients. As one recent commentator stated: "[T]he conclu-
sion that 'stress causes illness' remains completely tenable; however,
such a conclusion is also nearly meaningless."
' 31
C. Placebo Effects
The physician's communications with the patient not only affect
the patient's anxiety level, and thus potentially his susceptibility to
stress-related disorders; they also have a related effect on the patient's
mind as an agent in the therapeutic process. Even less is known about
the processes whereby the mind performs its therapeutic role than
about the physiology of stress-related disorders. That there is a psy-
chological component to healing, however, that can be mobilized by a
physician's presence, words, or touch, or by the administration of a
potion or supplication of a deity has long been acknowledged by medi-
cal practitioners. 3 2 Indeed, it has been suggested that "[t]he history
of medical treatment can be characterized largely as the history of the
placebo effect.' 3 3 This was particularly true prior to the discovery of
penicillin and the subsequent surge of effective drugs. 34 Describing
ward practice in the 1920's, Lewis Thomas notes that of all patients
diagnosed during a three month period, "I can recall only three or four
patients for whom the diagnosis resulted in the possiblity of doing
something to change the course of the illness, and each of these in-
volved calling in the surgeons to do something-removal of a thyroid
nodule, a gallbladder, an adrenal tumor."135 With scientific medicine
131. Kasl, supra note 84, at 335.
132. See, ag., J. KATZ, supra note 24, at 6-7, 9; Berg, The Placebo Effect Reconsidered,
17 J. FAii. PRACTICE 647 (1983); Bulger, Service as a Professional Sacrament:
Emotional Neutrality and the Power of the Word in Therapy, 142 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE 2291-92 (1982).
133. Shapiro, The Placebo Response, in 1971 MODERN PERSPECTIVES IN WORLD PSYCHI-
ATRY 596 (J. Howells ed.). The placebo effect is "the change in a patient's condi-
tion that is attributable to the symbolic impact of the healing intervention rather
than to the intervention's specific pharmacologic or physiologic effects." Brody,
The Lie That Heals: the Ethics of Giving Placebos, 97 ANNALs OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 112, 113 (1982).
134. Prior medical advances had been primarily in diagnostic techniques, P. STARR,
supra note 39, at 136-38; vaccinations, id. at 135; and surgical hygiene. Id.
135. L. THIozAs, THE YOUNGEST SCIENCE 31 (1983).
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thus limited, the physician's role was not unlike that of the ancient
witch doctor or the modern faith healer: to mobilize the patient's self-
healing capacities by offering hope and reassurance that cure was
underway.136
Physicians are uniform in acknowledging the positive therapeutic
effect of these psychological factors.137 Nor have they been rendered
passe by the introduction of numerous drugs, highly sophisticated sur-
gical techniques, and complex technology. In some cases, self-healing
under the physician's direction can avoid the necessity of resort to the
tools of modern medicine. 38 In others, the placebo response can en-
hance the effectiveness of medical therapy.139 As Katz notes: "The
revolutionary change in medical practice ushered in by the age of sci-
ence can be summed up as follows: while before, treatment consisted
almost entirely of the placebo effect, it is now both placebo effect and
science."140
When courts or physicians state that disclosure of risks or uncer-
tainties will "jeopardize the success of the proposed therapy,' 4 ' or "en-
danger the recovery of the patient,"'142 it is probably the placebo effect
to which they refer. Without the full reassurance of the physician and
the resulting placebo effect, these courts seem to be saying, medical
science does not stand as high a chance of success in treating the pa-
tient. In viewing the patient as "harmed" when the placebo effect is
unavailable to him, these courts join the medical profession in implic-
136. Bulger, supra note 132, at 2292. Up through the early nineteenth century it was
popularly believed that illness had a moral component, as a sign of God's displea-
sure, and it was quite common for clergymen to double as physicians. P. STAR,
supra note 39, at 35-36, 39-40.
137. See, e.g., J. KATZ, supra note 24, at 193; L. THoMAs, supra note 135, at 200; Vogel,
Goodwin & Goodwin, The Therapeutics of Placebo, 22 AMER. FAM. PHYSICIAN 105
(1980).
138. In a study of angina patients, half were subjected to ligation of the internal ma-
mary arteries, a surgical procedure theretofore considered therapeutic for angina
pectoris. The other half received merely anesthesia and an incision, leading them
to believe the surgical procedure had been performed when it fact it had not. The
two groups received equal relief from anginal pain, leading to the conclusion that
the relief was due to the placebo effect rather than to the surgery. Brecher, Sur-
gery as Placebo, 176 J. A.M.A. 1102 (1961). For examples of nondeceptive placebo
use, see, e.g., Vogel, Goodwin & Goodwin, supra note 137, at 107-08; Brody, supra
note 133, at 117.
139. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 132, at 648; Brody, supra note 133, at 112.
140. J. KATz, supra note 24, at 195. The placebo effect is so well accepted that studies
of the safety and effectiveness of new drugs are required to compare the effects of
the drug with the effects of a placebo that the recipient believes to be the drug in
order to sort out which efforts are attributable to the drug itself rather than the
placebo effect engendered by taking the drug. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a)(5)(ii)
(1984).
141. Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965).
142. Tatro v. Lueken, 212 Kan. 606, 615, 512 P.2d 529, 537 (1973).
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itly recognizing the placebo effect as an integral part of the physician's
therapeutic arsenal.
The difficulty with this judicial approach does not lie in its recogni-
tion of the psychological component of healing. Rather, the difficulty
lies in oversimplifying a complex and little-understood psycho-physio-
logical phenomenon.143 As was true of the stress-disease relationship,
the process by which psychological stimuli can expand the body's ca-
pacity for self-healing and the circumstances in which this result oc-
curs are not known.144 Knowledge concerning the placebo response
must be measured, therefore, by the empirical studies documenting
situations in which the response has occurred. Most of this research
has centered on the therapeutic effects of pure placebos14S - that is,
substances or procedures having no specific pharmacologial or other
purely physiologicl effect on the patient's condition.146 Thus studies
have demonstrated the extent to which certain symptoms or disorders
can be relieved by inactive "drugs" (sugar pills)147 or bogus surgery.148
It is much more difficult to attribute therapeutic effects to the placebo
response when the treatment provided to the patient itself has cura-
tive potential, and little if any reaseach has attempted to do so. Thus,
although research has shown a wide variety of conditions to be respon-
sive to placebos (primarily inactive drugs),149 it is not known whether
placebo administration merely approximates the results of pharmaco-
logically active drugs150 or whether and to what extent it can improve
on the pharmacological properties of active drugs.'15 Similarly, the
143. Problems similar to those presented for the placebo effect are inherent in justify-
ing nondisclosures on the basis of what might be called the "reverse placebo ef-
fect" - the tendency of risk disclosure to increase the likelihood that the risk will
materialize. See Wolf, The Pharmacology of Placebos, 11 PHARMACOLOGICAL REV.
689, 692 (1959).
144. Berg, supra note 132, at 648; Shapiro, Struening & Shapiro, THE RELIABILITY AND
VALIDITY OF A PLACEBO TEST, 15 J. PsYCIATRIc RESEARCH 253 (1980); Shapiro,
Etiological Factors in Placebo Effect, 187 J. A.M.A. 712 (1964). Recent research
has demonstrated that the release of endorphins is a factor in pain reduction at-
tributable to the placebo effect. This isolated discovery is but a small first step
toward understanding the etiology of placebo. Berg, supra note 132, at 648;
Brody, supra note 133, at 115-16.
145. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 133, at 112-13; Ross & Olson, The Expectancy -Attribu-
tion Model of the Effects of Placebos, 88 PSYCHOLOGICAL REv. 408, 409-10, 416-26
(1981); Shapiro, Struening & Shapiro, supra note 144, at 253-57.
146. See Brody, supra note 133, at 112.
147. See sources cited supra note 145.
148. See supra note 138.
149. See Vogel, Goodwin & Goodwin, supra note 137, at 105-06; Brody, supra note 133,
at 112.
150. See Ross & Olson, supra note 145, at 417.
151. The results of a study reported by Brody, supra note 133, suggest that placebo
responses can affect the efficacy of active therapy:
[Wlhen neprobromate, phenobarbital, and placebo were administered
blindly to anxious patients, the two pharmacologically active drugs were
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extent of the placebo effect accompanying any non-drug therapy is un-
known. Thus there is no scientific basis for believing that any particu-
lar therapy will be rendered more effective by placebo response in the
patient.
If it is assumed that the efficacy of any treatment can be enhanced
or diminished by the patient's attitude, this leaves the question of how
to evoke the appropriate therapeutic attitude. Advocates of the thera-
peutic justification for nondisclosure assume that the placebo response
is induced by giving the patient hope and reassurance. They see dis-
closure of information concerning the risks and uncertainties involved
in treatment as inconsistent with this goal.152 There are a number of
flaws in this position. First and most obvious, it is not necessary that
truthfulness be coupled with an absence of hope or reassurance.153
The procedure recommended by the physician generally provides an
ample foundation for hope despite its risks or uncertainties. More-
over, authorities believe that the physician's manner has as much to
do with reassuring the patient as does the content of his disclosures..54
Indeed, the content of the information given the patient may have
little to do with the strength of the placebo response. There is evi-
dence that the placebo effect occurs in patients receiving ingested sub-
stances even when the patient has been told that the substance is a
placebo.55 Some physicians belive that the physician's touch is the
clearly superior to placebo when administered by a physician who has
confidence in the drugs' efficacy and who was viewed by the subjects as
supportive; the drugs and placebo showed no difference when adminis-
tered by a less supportive and more skeptical physcian. Subjects of the
first physician also showed more overall symptom relief.
Id. at 113.
152. This position probably bears some subliminal linkage to the historic association of
placebo with deception. Traditionally the term placebo referred to a substance
known by the physician to be without active pharmacological properties, but
which the patient was led to view as having such properties. It was assumed that
the patient's false belief in the potency of the substance was essential to invoking
the placebo effect. Brody, supra note 133, at 113. According to Brody, "the bulk
of the medical literature on the ethics of placebos accepts this model as a given."
Id.
153. S. BOK, supra note 57, at 253; Brody, Hope, 246 J. A.M.A. 1411 (1981).
154. In Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970), the physician testified:
[H]e had high blood pressure, he had pain in his chest which we are try-
ing to find an answer to, and if I had sat down with Dr. Nishi and said,
"We are about to inject something into you which has a remote chance of
causing you to be paralyzed, you may get an immediate reaction which
will cost you your life." If I had said these things to Dr. Nishi, I think it
would have been a terrible mistake.
Id at 193, 473 P.2d at 120. The method of disclosure posited by this physician is
designed neither to maximize the placebo effect nor to minimize stress.
155. Park, Covi & Uhlenhoth, Effects of Informed Consent on Research Patients &
Study Results, 145 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 349 (1967); Park & Covi, Non-
blind Placebo TriaLk An Exploration of Neurotic Outpatients' Responses to Pla-
cebo Wihen Content is Disclosed, 12 ARCHIvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 336 (1965).
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primary means for activating the placebo response in a patient.1 56
Others suggest his concerned presence, or his appearance of confi-
dence. 57 Another plausible source of the response is the patient's
confidence in the physician. In some patients, the confidence neces-
sary to bring about this result may be a blind faith in the physician's
ability to cure.158 In others, however, that confidence may be more
closely related to a belief that the physician cares. One physician sug-
gests that "it is the purity and intensity of [the physician's benevolent]
motivation that, if accurately communicated to the patient, allows the
patient to relax in confidence and have a better chance of healing him-
self."159 The necessary confidence may also arise merely from the
physician's personal authority as a member of the medical profession
rather than from any particular act of the physician. Finally, some
authorities believe that the necessary mental attitude is in fact created
by the joint decision-making process envisioned by informed consent
law.160 This process creates a close relationship between physician
and patient that may be conducive to the placebo response. It may
also engender a greater commitment in the patient to the chosen
course of action, thus enhancing the positive mental response.
Further, the placebo effect is not equally potent in all patients.
Studies testing the effectiveness of placebos on various conditions
have observed a therapeutic effect in groups of patients ranging from
20 to 60 percent.161 The task of identifying susceptible patients is com-
plicated further by evidence that placebo response in any given indi-
vidual varies over time.162 It is not surprising, therefore, that
researchers have been unable to link placebo responsiveness with any
particular "personality type."'163 What all this adds up to is a situation
in which some, but not all, patients are susceptible to the placebo re-
sponse, but only in certain circumstances, and there are no demon-
strated criteria for identifying either the patients or the
circumstances. There is thus no rational means for selecting patients
for nondisclosure motivated by placebo-inducement. To select all al-
156. See J. KATZ, supra note 24, at 190; L. THOMAs, supra note 135, at 56-57.
157. See Wolf, supra note 143, at 696. The importance of the physician's own attitude
is the basis for the double-blind model of medical research, in which neither pa-
tient nor physician knows which patients are receiving the experimental therapy
and which are receiving a placebo.
158. See J. KATz, supra note 24, at 200.
159. Bulger, supra note 132, at 2290.
160. J. KATZ, supra note 24, at 223; Gutheil, Bursztajn & Brodsky, Malpractice Pre-
vention through the Sharing of Uncertainty, 311 NEw ENG. J. MgD. 49 (1984).
161. Brody, supra note 133, at 102; Shapiro, supra note 144, at 712; Vogel, Goodwin &
Goodwin, supra note 137, at 253-56.
162. Brody, supra note 133, at 112; Shapiro, Struening & Shapiro, supra note 144, at
253-56.
163. Brody, supra note 133, at 112; Shapiro, supra note 144, at 712; Vogel, Goodwin &
Goodwin, supra note 137, at 102.
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lows the therapeutic justification to abrogate entirely the rule of in-
formed consent; to select less than all can be accomplished only by
resort to blatant arbitrariness.
The attempt to justify nondisclosure based on the placebo effect
thus fails for several reasons to meet the stated test of substantial like-
lihood of significant adverse effect. There is no evidence that the pla-
cebo response furthers treatment of any particular condition when
combined with a treatment program having independent therapeutic
effect. Nor is there any rational basis for determining which patients
would be aided by the placebo response. Even if mechanisms existed
for identifying the conditions and patients for which the placebo re-
sponse would be efficacious, there is no evidence to suggest that non-
disclosure is an effective means for producing that response. Indeed,
several alternative theories seem more widely accepted by scholars in
the field. Consequently, there is no legitimate basis for concluding
that nondisclosure will aid the treatment of any particular patient
through invocation of the placebo response.
D. Rejection of Proferred Treatment as Harm
One further form of harm accepted by courts as a justification for
nondisclosure is the potential negative effect on the patient's decision
making.164 The nontherapeutic outcome does not arise directly from
the disclosure. Rather, it results from an intervening factor, the pa-
tient's choice of a less beneficial therapy or rejection of therapy alto-
gether.165 This justification can have no validity when applied to the
rational patient, as it is inconsistent with the theoretical underpin-
nings of informed consent. The purpose of the informed consent doc-
trine is not merely to promote the communication of risk information
to the patient, as is implied by this justification. The doctrine is also
founded upon the patient's autonomy, his right to determine whether
and when medical treatment may be administered to his body. When
164. E.g., Hales v. Pittman, 118 Ariz. 305, 311 n.4, 576 P.2d 493, 499 n.4 (1978); Thomas
v. Berrios, 348 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp.
Med. Cent., 81 Wash. 2d 12, 25-26, 499 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1972). This particular applica-
tion of the therapeutic justification was rejected in Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
165. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (physician testi-
fied that certain disclosure "is not good medical practice because it might deter
patients from undergoing needed surgery.. ."); Percle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289, 1297 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (physician testified that "he gave
no further explanation because . . .he felt Appellant might reject surgery which
he believed to be in Appellant's best interest"). This rationale has been approved
in dicta by at least two courts. One stated that "[t]he doctrine of informed con-
sent does not require the doctor to risk frightening the patient out of a course of
treatment which sound medical judgment dictates the patient should undertake."
ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Ctr., 81 Wash. 2d 12, 25-26, 499 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1972).
Accord Thomas v. Berrios, 348 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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a patient determines that a proferred treatment should not be admin-
istered, he has not been harmed in any legal sense when that treat-
ment is withheld. Indeed, the entire concept of informed consent is
illusory if it provides on one hand that information must be provided
to the patient in order that he may make an informed decision con-
cerning treatment, and on the other hand that the information should
be withheld if the patient's decision might conflict with that of the
physician.
Furthermore, this interpretation of the therapeutic justification
presumes a certainty concerning optimal therapy that may not exist.
In many instances the medical community itself is divided as to the
best response to a given situation.166 Even where physicians are
united, however, factors peculiar to an individual's lifestyle or values
may cause an approach other than the medically accepted one to be
optimal in context. Harm is thus a fluid concept linked less to out-
come per se than to the relationship between outcome, situation, and
values, including those values linked to autonomy.
A concept that seems to have more theoretical validity posits a situ-
ation where disclosure renders the patient so frightened or emotion-
ally distraught as to preclude rational decisionmaking.167 Under this
theory disclosure destroys autonomy because it disrupts rational deci-
sionmaking. Closer examination, however, reveals that this theory is
only a more appealing repesentation of the idea that nondisclosure is
justified simply because the patient might reject the physician's
recommendation.
Even on its face, the rule invites the view that a patient's decision
to reject the physician's recommendation is inherently irrational. The
prevalence of such an attitude among both physicians and courts is
evidenced in cases such as Lane v. Candura,168 where a court was
asked to override a patient's refusal of treatment. The patient in Lane
had initially consented to amputation of her gangrenous leg, but with-
drew her consent on the morning of the scheduled operation.169 Re-
sponding to a psychiatrist's testimony that the patient was
incompetent to make a rational choice,17o the trial court held that the
166. For example physicians continue to debate which is the "best" treatment for
breast cancer- radical mastectomy or some combination of less drastic surgery,
chemotherapy, radiation therapy, hormone therapy, and immunotherapy. See J.
KATZ, supra note 24, at 182-83.
167. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Downer v. Veil-
leux, 322 A.2d 82, 91 (Me. 1974); Gertz v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396, 410, 589 P.2d 180,
194 (1978); Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Inkformed Consent Doctrine: Striking a
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L.
REV. 413, 462-65.
168. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
169. Id. at 380, 376 N.E.2d at 1234.
170. Id. at 382, 376 N.E.2d at 1235.
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irrationality of the patient's choice justified the appointment of a
guardian to make the decision.171 This holding was rejected by the
appellate court, which noted that the psychiatrist and the trial court
were both interpreting rationality to mean medical rationality,172 and
hence labeled the patient irrational (and perhaps incompetent) merely
because her decision differed from that of her physicians. The court
pointed out that until the patient changed her mind and rejected the
surgery, no-one had questioned her competence, and that "even now"
the hospital and physicians were prepared to proceed with the surgery
if the patient were to accede. 173 Both health care professionals and
the trial judge were equating rationality, and perhaps competence as
well, with agreement with the medical viewpoint.174 There is no rea-
son to believe that this practice would not also be followed in justify-
ing therapeutic nondisclosures on the ground that they would lead to
irrational decision making.
Proponents of the rule might argue that the irrationality label is
reserved for decisions where fear will cause the patient to give undue
weight to particular unfavorable information.175 Yet this analysis re-
quires that the physician rather than the patient determine what
171. Id. at 379, 376 N.E.2d at 1233-34.
172. Id. at 383, 376 N.E.2d at 1235-36. The court subsequently seems to accept the view
that the decision is irrational, id. ("But the irrationality of her decision, does not
justify a conclusion that Mrs. Candura is incompetent in the legal sense."),
though it may simply be assuming this fact as not determinative of the outcome.
The court notes elsewhere that the patient's decision was influenced by strong
emotional factors that do not influence a physician's decision making. Id.
173. Id. at 383 n.6, 376 N.E.2d at 1235 n.6. As Katz points out, rarely does anyone
question the rationality of a patient's decision to follow the doctor's recommenda-
tion, regardless of how serious the risks or how problematic in the context of a
particular patient's life pattern. J. KATz, supra note 24, at 161.
174. That the physician's recommendation is also influenced by factors irrational in
the context of determining what is best for the patient is generally overlooked.
One surgeon admits that at one time he consistently recommended radical mas-
tectomy for breast cancer in rebellion against his physician father who preferred
an alternative treatment. J. KATz, supra note 24, at 173. Other more pervasive
factors include physicians' preference for procedures with which they feel most
familiar, id. at 189, and their heightened fear of death. A study comparing the
attitudes of physicians, seriously and terminally ill patients, and healthy individu-
als found that physicians were significantly more afraid of death than other
groups. Feifel, Physicians Consider Death, 1967 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. Psy-
CHOLOGICAL Ass'N 201. Katz notes also that physicians tend to view death as a
personal defeat. J. KATz, supra note 24, at 219. Thus, creation of a situation in
which the patient merely ratifies the physician's decision does not necessarily re-
sult in a medically rational decision.
175. Although the Canterbury court rejects emphatically "the paternalistic notion
that the physician may remain silent simply because divulgence might prompt
the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the patient really needs," Can-
terbury v. Spence, 564 F.2d 772, 789, (D.C. Cir. 1972), it accepts as one basis for
therapeutic nondisclosure the prospect that a patient might "become so ill or
emotionally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a rational decision." Id. Ac-
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weight is due or undue. As has previously been demonstrated, physi-
cians' and patients' assignments of weight reflect different values, and
the purpose of informed consent doctrine is to protect the subjective
values of the patient. The "undue weight" argument strips the patient
of this protection, and once more, albeit less directly, equates rational-
ity with the medical viewpoint. Furthermore, the patient is denied his
autonomy not because he has already given "undue" weight to the un-
favorable information, but because the physician believes that he will
do so. The rule thus ascribes to physicians a highly developed predic-
tive skill regarding the decisionmaking of individual patients that the
profession has not yet demonstrated it possesses.17 6 Where a patient is
truly incapable of making a rational decision, the law has established
procedures for protecting his interests, including appointment of a
guardian to act in his behalf.
IV. THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF THE THERAPEUTIC
JUSTIFICATION
Even if medical science were sufficiently advanced to demonstrate
a relationship between disclosure and disease, and to identify patients
at risk, the basic premise that a physician is justified in withholding
information that threatens harm to the patient is questionable on legal
grounds. Inherent in this premise is a conclusive presumption that
physical well-being is to be protected at the expense of autonomy, for
autonomy cannot operate in a factual vacuum. If the physician with-
holds material information, he also withholds the opportunity for
meaningful choice.
The conflict between autonomy and physical well-being is not new
to the law, nor is it confined to the medical context. The common law
of torts has long recognized that the individual's interest in freedom
from bodily harm does not include contact to which he has con-
sented.17 7 Consequently, an individual who willingly steps into the
boxing ring is not legally protected from any ensuing physical
harm. 78 Similarly, the law of negligence relieves the actor of liability
for harm caused to one who has expressly agreed to assume the risk of
cord Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 246, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516
(1972); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 651, 222 S.E.2d 783, 788 (1976).
176. There is no evidence of impairment of rationality having resulted from risk dis-
closure; even rejection of physicians' recommendations occurs infrequently. It is
difficult enough to determine that a particular decision is the result of impaired
rationality, it is almost impossible to predict this result.
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 892A (1979).
178. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 113. The consent only extends to con-
duct that might reasonably have been anticipated and does not encompass such
deviations as the use of brass knuckles. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs
§ 892A comment e (1979).
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harm.179 Ordinarily no public policy is contravened by a party's volun-
tary choice to incur or risk incurring physical harm.180 As Prosser
notes:
It is a fundamental principle of the common law that volunti nonfit injuria -
to one who is willing, no harm is done. The attitude of the courts has not, in
general, been one of paternalism. Where no public interest is contravened,
they have left the individual to work out his own destiny, and are not con-
cerned with protecting him from his own folly in permitting others to do him
harm.
1 8 1
Thus the common law of torts gives a higher priority to individual au-
tonomy than to blanket protection from physical harm.
These basic tort principles are not without applicability in the med-
ical field. The patient's right to refuse potentially beneficial treat-
ment is well established.182 Modern cases strongly endorse the right
to refuse treatment even where death is the likely result. 8 3 The doc-
trine of informed consent itself grew out of these principles, the right
to information being a necessary corollary to the right to determine
whether or not one will undergo a proposed treatment. 8 4 It is only in
the context of the therapeutic privilege that physical well-being (as
defined by the physician) is elevated to a position superior to self-
determination.
The prioritization of autonomy and health has constitutional
dimensions as well. The Supreme Court has recognized a constitu-
tional right to privacy that protects the individual's "interest in inde-
pendence in making certain kinds of important decisions."185 Most of
the Supreme Court cases invoking this right have involved intimate
family matters such as the selection of a spouse, 8 6 the decision
whether or not to have children, 8 7 and choices as to how one's chil-
179. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 480-84.
180. Id. at 482. Public policy may, however, be implicated in special circumstances, as
where there are disparities in bargaining power or a public utility seeks to avoid
liability for negligent performance of its duty of public service. Id. Agreements
by patients to assume the risk of physicians' negligence are not upheld. E.g., Em-
ory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981).
181. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 112.
182. See, e.g., Schloendorf v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914).
183. The court in In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 634, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980), character-
ized this position as "something approaching consensus." Accord Eichner v. Dil-
lon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 454-55, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 536 (1980).
184. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 180; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-
82 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-07, 350 P.2d 1083, 1104
(1960). See also Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 434, 88 N.W.2d
186, 190 (1958).
185. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
186. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
187. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54
(1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942). Although decisions con-
cerning abortion and contraception also have a medical aspect, the Court in Ak-
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dren will be raised.18 8 Cases from state and lower federal courts, how-
ever, have recognized that medical decision making also partakes of
the characteristics of constitutionally protected privacy.18 9 The ra-
tionale for this extension was set forth in a particularly articulate
opinion recognizing patients' access to acupuncture as within a
broader right "to obtain or reject medical treatment."190 The court
found in the Supreme Court's privacy opinions the criteria that a pro-
tected decision must be both personal and important, and regarded
these criteria as easily satisfied by medical decision making:
The decision to obtain or reject medical treatment, no less than the deci-
sion to continue or terminate pregnancy, meets both criteria. First, although
decisions "relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, and education"
... often involve and affect other individuals as directly as they do one's self,
decisions relating to medical treatment do not. They are, to an extraordinary
degree, intrinsically personal. It is the individual making the decision, and no
one else, who, if he or she survives, must live with the results of that decision.
One's health is a uniquely personal possession. The decision of how to treat
that possession is of a no less personal nature.
Second, it is impossible to discuss the decision to obtain or reject medical
treatment without realizing its importance. The decision can either produce
or eliminate physical, psychological, and emotional ruin. It can destroy one's
economic stability. It is, for some, the difference between a life of pain and a
life of pleasure. It is, for others, the difference between life and death.1 9 1
Other cases have found the constitutional right to privacy implicated
by the decision to reject life-prolonging medical treatment 9 2 and the
decision to receive from a physician a form of therapy not endorsed by
the majority of the medical profession. 93 These cases make a persua-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983), stated that
the Roe decision was "based firmly" on the individual's "freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life." Id. at 2491.
188. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
189. E.g., Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980); Andrews v. Bal-
lard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Rogers v. State Bd. of Med. Examiners,
371 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1979). Contra People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697,591 P.2d 919,
153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979).
190. Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
191. Id. at 1046-47. The court held unconstitutional a state regulation restricting the
practice of acupuncture to licensed physicians when there were no licensed physi-
cians in the state who were trained to or did perform acupuncture.
192. E.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 72, 85,
370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976);
Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.2d 431, 454, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 537-39 (1980).
193. Rogers v. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 371 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1979) (relying on
state constitution). The case for including medical decisions within the right to
privacy is particularly persuasive when compared to some of the other decisions
the Court states are encompassed within this right. See, eg., Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess pornography in the home); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to attend private school); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to learn the German language).
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sive argument that all medical decisions are protected by the constitu-
tional right of privacy.
In the abortion context, the right to privacy was held to be counter-
balanced by a compelling state interest in protecting the health of the
mother.194 Thus, state laws designed to protect the health of women
undergoing an abortion have been upheld.195 The Court has never
accepted the notion, however, that the interest in maternal health can
justify a regulation that bars or even significantly burdens the decision
to have an abortion. 196 Similarly, state and lower federal courts con-
sistently have found the interest in protecting life, which would seem
to be the apotheosis of the state's health-related interests, insufficient
to justify overriding a patient's refusal of life-saving treatment.
197
194. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973), reaffd, Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2492 (1983). In Roe, the Court held that the
state's interest in protecting the health of the mother becomes compelling at the
end of the first trimester because it is at that point that mortality from abortion
exceeds mortality from normal childbirth. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1983).
The court in Akron seemed to reject the mortality rationale, but retained the
second trimester standard as a reasonable legal framework, stating that the per-
missibility of state health regulations would depend on their medical reasonable-
ness. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2492 n.11
(1983).
195. See Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983) (requirement that second-tri-
mester abortions be performed in licensed hospital or clinic); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983) (requirement of pathology
report on tissue removed in abortion). Where the state could not demonstrate a
significant medical benefit to the mother, regulations purportedly justified by the
interest in health have been struck down. See Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2493-45 (1983) (requirement that second trimester
abortions be performed in a hospital); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976) (prohibition of abortion by saline amnios-
centesis in second and third trimesters). The determinative question in these
cases is "whether there is a reasonable medical basis for the regulation." Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2492 n.11 (1983).
196. The Court in Roe stated that the compelling interest in maternal health allows
the state to regulate abortion, whereas the compelling interest in potentional life
allows the state to "regulate, and even proscribe" abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113,163, 164-65 (1973). In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S.
Ct. 2481 (1983), the Court stated: "The comparison between abortion and child-
birth mortality rates may be relevant only where the State employs a health ra-
tionale as a justification for a complete prohibition on abortions in certain
circumstances." Id. at 2492 n.11. This statement suggests an acceptance of only a
limited prohibition of certain forms of abortion or of abortion in certain situa-
tions, and only where the form or situation presents a significant threat to the
mother's life ("mortality"). This interpretation is supported by the Court's cita-
tion to Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 78-79
(1976) (invalidating state ban on saline abortions, a method that was "safer, with
respect to maternal mortality, than even continuation of the pregnancy until
childbirth"). Thus the decision to have an abortion can be limited in ways that
affect the location, cost, or possibly method, but the right to make and implement
the abortion decision per se must remain.
197. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
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These cases support the conclusion that the constitution, like the com-
mon law, accords priority to individual autonomy-at least in regard
to personal and important decisions such as the receipt of medical
treatment-over individual physical well-being. Where the individual
treatment decision will affect the health of the wider community, a
public interest requiring mandated treatment has been recognized.198
Where the individual treatment decision directly affects only the indi-
vidual decision maker,19 9 however, the public interest in protecting
autonomy is stronger than the public interest in protecting health:
The constitutional right to privacy... is an expression of the sanctity of indi-
vidual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life.
The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision to refuse treat-
ment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of
choice.
2 0 0
If the patient's autonomy in making medical decisions has a higher
legal priority than his physical well-being, there is no valid basis for
sacrificing autonomy in order to avoid adverse health effects.
741-42, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (1977); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 454-57, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517, 537-39 (1980).
198. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding compulsory
vaccination law); Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College,
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (upholding mandatory blood transfusion for Jeho-
vah's Witness where patient has dependent minor children). In Jacobson the
Court stated.
There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the
supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any
human government, especially of any free government existing under a
written constitution, to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is
equally true that in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in re-
spect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as
the safety of the general public may demand.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). Justice Burger, at the time sit-
ting on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, later dis-
tinguished the vaccination cases from the refusal of treatment situation, in that
the former involved "public health measures" rather than paternalistic decision
making for a single individual. Application of President & Directors of Ge-
orgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1016 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (separate opinion).
199. Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) ('"The pregnant woman cannot be iso-
lated in her pregnancy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus .... The situa-
tion is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of
obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education [with which the state
was barred from interfering]").
200. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,742,370
N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977). Responding to the suggestion that a compelling state in-
terest in sustaining life could override a patient's treatment decisions, another
court stated '"The notion that the individual exists for the good of the state is, of
course, quite antithetical to our fundamental thesis that the role of the state is to
ensure a maximum of individual freedom of choice and conduct." In re Osborne,
294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972).
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In no area of law other than the therapeutic justification does the
patient's health routinely override his right to decide whether to re-
ceive treatment. The reversal of normal priorities that permeates the
therapeutic justification can probably be traced to two sources. The
first is the judicial deference to professional expertise,201 of which the
medical profession has traditionally been a primary beneficiary.O2
The Supreme Court's abortion decisions, for instance, are rife with
statements of respect for the physician's professional judgment,203 and
sometimes seem to refer to the protected decision as the physician's
rather than the patient's.204 In those cases, as in other cases involving
the constitutional right to privacy, the asserted interests of physican
and patient were identical.205 Deference to professional expertise is
also seen in malpractice litigation, where such expertise is needed to
establish a norm of medical behavior against which to measure the
conduct of the defendant physician.206 Unlike these situations, it can-
not be assumed in instances wherein the therapeutic justification
might be asserted that there is an identity of interests between physi-
cian and patient. Professional expertise in such situations can, at
most, predict the physical consequences of disclosure. It cannot deter-
mine whether disclosure should be made or whether the recom-
mended treatment should be provided, as these decisions are based
201. See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 579-80 (1976).
202. See, e.g., McKay v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 103 Colo. 305, 86 P.2d 232
(1938).
203. E.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481,2491 (1983);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196-97, 199-200 (1973). See also Planned Parenthood
of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 77-79 (1976) (deference to standards of medical
profession), criticized in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S.
Ct. 2481, 2514-15 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
205. E.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (challenge to statute
prohibiting distribution of contraceptive to minor under sixteen); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977) (challenge to statute requiring physicians to report to state
agency names and addresses of persons for whom certain drugs are prescribed);
Rogers v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 371 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1979) (appeal of
disciplinary action against physician who performed chelation therapy on con-
senting patient).
206. Prosser states:
Since juries composed of laymen are normally incompetent to pass
judgment on questions of medical science or technique, it has been held
in the great majority of malpractice cases that there can be no finding of
negligence in the absence of expert testimony to support it....
It has been pointed out often enough that this gives the medical pro-
fession.., the privilege, which is usually emphatically denied to other
groups, of setting their own legal standards of conduct, merely by adopt-
ing their own practices....
[This deviation can be explained by] the healthy respect which the
courts have had for the learning of a fellow profession, and their reluc-
tance to overburden it with liability based on uneducated judgment.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 187-89.
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upon factors outside the realm of medical expertise. Deference to pro-
fessional expertise, which may be appropriate in other contexts, is not
appropriate when it would operate to displace individual autonomy,
particularly when the individual decision encompasses nonmedical as
well as medical factors.
20 7
The priority of health over autonomy in the context of therapeutic
nondisclosures may also reflect an assumption that the patient, if
given a choice, would choose not to hear the harmful information.
Seeing it as difficult or impossible to implement this choice without
abrogating the patient's autonomy to some degree, the court may
choose to give effect to the substance of the probable decision rather
than to the form of express decision making by the patient.
There is underlying merit in such an approach. The patient is cer-
tainly interested in his own physical well-being and it will be a pri-
mary factor in any decision he makes. If the patient were to agree
with the physician that his health would be best served by following
the physician's recommendation for treatment without disclosure of
unfavorable information, that might well be the course he would
choose. It is established in the caselaw that the patient's autonomy
encompasses the right to decline disclosure.2 08 By its nature, however,
this particular choice must be made in the absence of full information.
The "presumed choice" approach falls short, however, in not recog-
207. Critiques of reliance on expertise in the administrative context are equally perti-
nent here:
Expertness has been oversold in this country. The obvious and enor-
mous success of specialization in industry and the physical sciences has
led to the notion that specialization holds the answer to all questions in
politics, education, philosophy, and the social sciences generally....
Judge Wyzansky expresses the new skepticism of expertise with his cas-
ual felicity. "One of the dangers of extraordinary experience is that
those who have it may fall into the grooves created by their own expert-
ness. They refuse to believe that hurdles which they have learned by
experience are insurmountable can in fact be overcome by fresh, in-
dependent minds."
There is, moreover, a sense in which judges have more expertise than
commissioners. If the latter are expert in their special fields, the former
are experts in synthesis. Daily confronted with the entire range of social
conflict the judges acquire perspective, become aware, as no administra-
tor can, of all the conflicting goals towards which a society struggles.
Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdi-
cation of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REV. 436, 471-74 (1954). Like the
judge operating in the realm of social policy, so the patient within the realm of his
own life experience is in the best position to synthesize the physician's expertise
with his own varied conflicting goals.
208. E.g., Henderson v. Milobsky, 595 F.2d 654, 656 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 18, § 6852(b)(2) (Cumin. Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-
5(2)(d) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909(c)(2) (Supp. 1984). The patient's
right to decline disclosure has been abrogated by federal regulation where the
proposed treatment is experimental. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1984); 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.116 (1984).
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nizing that some, perhaps many, patients would choose to receive even
a potentially harmful disclosure in order to preserve their ability to
make an informed treatment decision.209 The courts are denying in-
formation to all patients who may be harmed in order to protect the
presumed choice of some of them. This approach derogates signifi-
cantly from overall patient autonomy, as none of the affected patients
are given a choice about either disclosure or treatment.21 0 A greater
measure of protection for autonomy results from the contrary ap-
proach of full disclosure to all patients even though some would have
preferred nondisclosure. All patients are given a choice concerning
treatment, and those who preferred full disclosure have received it.
Thus, a greater quantum of autonomy is protected where therapeutic
nondisclosures are not permitted.
It is not necesssary, however, to protect only the interests of one
group, either those preferring nondisclosure or those preferring full
disclosure despite possible harmful consequences. There are middle
grounds with the potential for protecting the choices of both groups.
The following section will analyze possible mechanisms for allowing a
patient to choose nondisclosure while still protecting the autonomy of
patients desiring disclosure.
V. PROTECTING THE PATIENT'S CHOICE OF
NONDISCLOSURE
Let us initially dispense with the notion that vicarious decision-
making on behalf of the patient by a court,211 physician,212 next-of-
209. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
210. Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("The statist notion that government
power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents
abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.") (emphasis in
original).
211. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752-
53, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432-35 (1977) (court to determine whether incompetent patient
may be denied life-prolonging treatment). Although a judge can feasibly be used
to determine whether a comatose patient would choose to be removed from a
respirator, this option seems clearly impractical for determining whether a pa-
tient would wish to receive possibly harmful treatment information. The use of
the judicial process at this early stage of medical decision making would be un-
duly cumbersome. More importantly, the proceedings themselves and the need
for testimony from the patient would seem to destroy whatever therapeutic bene-
fits might be obtained from nondisclosure. Thus, even if vicarious decision mak-
ing were legally permissible, a court would be an inappropriate substitute
decision maker.
212. The practical effect of the therapeutic justification is decision-making by the phy-
sician, as the patient is denied the information that might cause him to reject the
physician's recommendation. Decision-making by the physician, however, is
fraught with conflict of values. The physician is too close to the situation and has
too many of his own notions of patient well-being to determine objectively what
course of action is in the patient's best interest or what the patient would choose.
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kin,213 or other legally designated party214 constitutes such a compro-
mise. This mechanism, advocated by several statutes and judicial deci-
sions as an adjunct to therapeutic nondisclosure,215 appears to be a
compromise between interests in the health and the self-determina-
tion of a particular patient.216 As demonstrated by the prior analysis,
however, there is no justification for imposing this type of compromise
Physicians have a long and well-established tradition of nondisclosure, traceable
to the time of Hippocrates, who admonished physicians to:
[Conceal] most things from the patient while you are attending to him.
Give necessary orders with cheerfulness and serenity, turning his atten-
tion away from what is being done to him; sometimes reprove sharply
and emphatically, and sometimes comfort with solicitude and attention,
revealing nothing of the patient's future or present condition.
2 HIPPROCRATES, DECORuM 297 (W. Jones trans. 1967). The authoritarian model
of the physician-patient relationship, though moderated, has prevailed through
the present. J. KATz, supra note 24, at 1-29. Physicians feel that their authority
is necessary to their healing function, id, at 189, 198-99; P. STARR, supra note 39,
at 4-5, and that it is justified because they and their patients share the same inter-
est in restoring the patient to health. J. KATZ, supra note 24, at 98. The physician
is thus inclined by training and tradition to opt for nondisclosure, and it is unreal-
istic to expect the physician to bring to the decision the range of values that
would be considered by a patient. As with judges, therefore, physicians are unac-
ceptable as vicarious decision-makers.
213. A relative may be more likely than other possible decisionmakers to be familiar
with the patient's values and beliefs, and thus in a better position to determine
what the patient's own choice would be. However, a relative is as likely as a phy-
sician to confuse his own values with those of the patient, particularly where he
has had no direct discussion with the patient of the matter in question. Compare
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976), with Eichner v. Dillon, 73
A.D.2d 431,473,426 N.Y.S.2d 517,547-48 (1980). This confusion is especially likely
to manifest itself in the tendency of others to wish to spare the patient anxiety
and pain, see supra note 162, a tendency magnified in persons emotionally at-
tached to the patient. Further, a relative would be more likely than the patient
himself to be intimidated by the physician's professional authority: if the physi-
cian recommends nondisclosure and a particular course of treatment as in the
patient's best interest, it will be very difficult for a caring relative, not knowing of
any specific contrary desires of the patient, to refuse.
214. The court in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (1976), directed that
the decision be made by the family and physician, with the affirmance of a hospi-
tal ethics committee.
215. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,784 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cornfeldt v. Tongen,
262 N.W.2d 684, 701 n.14 (Minn. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651(9) (Supp.
1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909(d) (Supp. 1984).
216. This is true even where the court requires the decision maker to proceed under a
"substituted judgement" rule, whereby he is directed to determine what course
the patient would have selected had he been able to make the choice himself. See,
e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41-42,
355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976). Because no other person can duplicate the patient's
choice with any certitude, vicarious decision making using the substituted judge-
ment rule represents a compromise of the patient's autonomy when the patient is
competent and capable of making the decision himself. In the Strunk and Quin-
lan cases this compromise was necessitated by the incompetent patient's inability
to make decisions for himself.
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on the individual.217 What is needed, rather, is a mechanism for com-
promising the potentially conflicting interests in self-determination of
those who would choose disclosure and those who would choose
nondisclosure.
Rather than forcing either disclosure or nondisclosure on patients,
the law should recognize a right of choice in regard to disclosure as
well as treatment. Indeed, when information is withheld because of
its potential harmful effects on the patient, nondisclosure is itself a
form of therapy, and hence subject to existing principles of informed
consent. The patient has a right to choose whether to avail himself of
the purported therapeutic benefits of surgery, drugs, or psychother-
apy. There is no reason why he should not also have a right to choose
whether to avail himself of the purported therapeutic benefits of
nondisclosure.
The difficulty with this concept is not in its premise but in its im-
plementation. By informing the patient of the therapeutic benefits to
be achieved through nondisclosure, the physician may bring about the
very effects he was seeking to avoid. Indeed, the effects may be com-
pounded by the uncertainty that would be generated in the patient by
his awareness that the treatment encompasses risks so severe that the
mere knowledge of them could cause harm, though their magnitude
and probability are unknown. Thus, some deviation from the pure in-
formed consent model of contemporaneous decison making based on
cognizance of all material facts is necessary if the choice of nondisclo-
sure is to have any meaning. A procedure must be defined that pro-
tects both the form and purpose of the nondisclosure choice, while
providing the opportunity to make an informed choice of disclosure.
The difficulty in allowing the patient to determine whether infor-
mation should be withheld on therapeutic grounds derives from the
fact that this decision-making process can have harmful effects when
it takes place within the therapeutic context. An obvious way to avoid
this problem is to remove the decision from the therapeutic context.21
8
For instance, the decision concerning disclosure could be part of the
217. Indeed, in Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970), the court held
that the patient's spouse had no legal authority to make a decision for the patient
where the latter was mentally competent and had the legal capacity to act. Id. at
198-99, 473 P.2d at 122-23. Interestingly, the court felt no compunction about ef-
fectively allowing the physicians to make a treatment decision for the patient,
this being the practical outcome of the withholding from both patient and spouse
of information that could have affected the patient's decision. See id. at 200, 473
P.2d at 123 (disclosure to family members is merely "a considerate act on the part
of the physician to the spouse and the family; it is good public relations; and in
some cases, the discussion which follows the disclosure will be helpful to the phy-
sician in deciding his course of action") (emphasis added).
218. See Angell, Respecting the Autonomy of Competent Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1115, 1116 (1984).
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routine physical examination rather than part of the reaction to a spe-
cific malady or condition. At that time, the physician can explain to
the patient the types of situation in which he might be inclined to
withhold information from the patient on therapeutic grounds. The
physician can discuss potential benefits and drawbacks of nondisclo-
sure, with a special emphasis on the patient's inability to make a fully
informed decision concerning treatment if information is withheld.
The patient can then instruct the physician whether and under what
circumstances he wants information withheld and, if so, in whom he
wants decision making authority to reside.219 This instruction will
conclusively establish the existence or nonexistence of any therapeu-
tic privilege.
Any decision made in advance involves uncertainty concerning the
events to which the decision will apply. The patient in this scenario
does not know what physical problems will beset him in the future,
what medical procedures will be available for diagnosing and treating
them, what his mental state will be at that time, and whether his val-
ues will have changed in the interim. The patient must consent to
nondisclosure in a future situation, the peculiarities of which cannot
be known to him, and the physician is required to provide sufficient
information concerning these uncertain future situations to enable the
patient to make an intelligent decision. Were the therapy kidney
transplantation or coronary bypass rather than nondisclosure of po-
tentially harmful information, advance disclosure and an advance de-
cision would undoubtedly be meaningless. However, the decision to
use nondisclosure as therapy differs in important respects from the
decision to use transplantation or coronary bypass as therapy.
The patient's decision to authorize therapeutic nondisclosure is by
a nature a generic one. It does not instruct the physician how to pro-
ceed in one specific situation, but rather in a range of situations. Fur-
ther, it is a decision that partakes more of personal values than of
medical science. In short, it is the kind of decision that is commonly
made in advance by legislative bodies and contracting parties: the es-
tablishing of a general rule of conduct by which affected parties must
conduct themselves in a range of situations.220 Indeed, neither courts
nor legislatures have felt constrained from setting general rules of
conduct for therapeutic nondisclosure by uncertainty concerning the
situations to which the rule will apply.22 ' Patients also are likely to
219. As to the latter, see infra notes 234-45 and accompanying text.
220. The necessity for predicting personal values at some future date in an uncertain
context is also shared with drafters of wills, who must determine the disposition
of their assets at death without knowing what assets will be owned at that time,
what their feelings will be for various potential recipients, or even what recipi-
ents will then be living.
221. Like a court or legislature, a patient should be able to direct the physician to
withhold any information he reasonably believes would be detrimental to the pa-
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have general opinions on the subject of therapeutic nondisclosure. It
is a matter as to which patients are capable of making generic deci-
sions and the law has previously accepted generic decisionmaking.
There is precedent for advance decision making by patients in the
substantial law recognizing and implementing advance decisions to
forego life-sustaining treatment. Legislatures in at least fourteen
states222 and courts in several others223 have ordered physicians to im-
plement such decisions, when the content of the decision can be
proved and there is no reason to believe it does not represent the con-
tinuing intent of the patient. 224
It must still be demonstrated, however, that advance decisionmak-
ing on the question of therapeutic nondisclosure advances the thera-
peutic interests of patients desiring nondisclosure without unduly
compromising their autonomy. It is doubtful that any significant
stress reaction will result from the physician's generalized explana-
tion of the pros and cons of nondisclosure when this explanation oc-
curs outside the context of a specific therapeutic situation. Similarly,
any lessening of the placebo effect for some condition months or years
in the future will be muted by the passage of time and the patient's
uncertainty as to whether information has been withheld in any spe-
cific therapeutic situation and the nature of such information.
Just as the time gap lessens the therapeutic repercussions of disclo-
sure, it raises questions concerning autonomy. The choice of a healthy
person might be quite different from the choice that same person
would make next year when affected by, e.g., a condition requiring
surgery. The President's Commission notes that self-determination
exercised through an advance directive lacks the important attribute
of "active, contemporaneous personal choice."225 When contempora-
tient's total care and best interests, see Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla.
1979), or to forego disclosures that he believes would so seriously upset the pa-
tient that the patient would not be able to dispassionately weigh the risks of re-
fusing to undergo the recommended procedure. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 220,
246, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972).
222. E.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 90-320 to 90-332 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. 5251-62 (Supp. 1984). For a com-
plete listing, see I PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 156 n.12.
223. Cf. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (decision to withdraw life sustaining measures should be based on pa-
tient's present intent, "living will" normally constituting best evidence thereof).
224. Id. at 620. The court held that the weight given to a previously executed "living
will" as evidence of a comatose patient's present intent should vary according to
"the timliness of its execution, the circumstances under which it was executed, its
contents and any evidence of a contrary intention." Id. Where the only evidence
of the patient's present intent consisted of conversations with friends prior to the
onset of the disabling condition, the court in Quinlan refused to consider testi-
mony of such conversations "where such testimony is without probative weight."
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
225. I PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 50. The Commission conducted no real
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neous decision is impractical or impossible, however, imperfect auton-
omy is preferable to no autonomy. Moreover, the Commission's
concern was expressed with regard to advance treatment decisions
made by the patient in anticipation of future incompetence, the living
will being the most prominent example. Unlike the patient who has
executed a living will, the patient who has made a choice concerning
therapeutic nondisclosure is likely to be competent at the time that
choice is to be carried out,226 as well as at other times between the
choice and its execution. If the patient wishes to alter his previous
choice, he has but to inform the physician of the change.227 This con-
temporaneous revocation differs from a contemporaneous initial
choice in that the latter unavoidably involves forewarning the patient
that proposed therapy involves risk sufficiently serious that its knowl-
edge may be harmful to the patient, whereas the opportunity for revo-
cation does not.
Of course, the advance choice/revocation alternative places on the
patient the burden of remembering his prior instruction to the physi-
cian and informing the physician of any desired change. The lessening
of autonomy occasioned by this allocation of burden seems justified by
the substantial enhancement of autonomy provided by the overall pro-
cess of advance decisionmaking. Nonetheless, it is preferable to sur-
round the advance decision with some solemnity in order to impress
the decision upon the patient's memory. The physician's manner dur-
ing the decision making process is probably the most important factor
in making the decision appear important and memorable to the pa-
tient; execution of a simple form, of which the patient is provided with
a copy, also would be useful.228
Protection of the patient's autonomy in an advance decisionmaking
context demands that he be given a wider range of choices than mere
approval or disapproval of whatever therapeutic nondisclosures the
physician may view as advisable. A patient might, for instance, wish
to disallow nondisclosures aimed solely at sparing him anxiety, or al-
low therapeutic nondisclosure only in the context of heart disease or
analysis of the implications of this defect, other than to conclude that "a decision
not to follow an advance directive may sometimes by justified even when it would
not be ethical to disregard a competent patient's contemporaneous choice." Id.
226. If the patient were incompetent at this time, his lack of capacity to make the
treatment decision would vitiate the physician's obligation to make disclosures
directly to the patient. When disclosures are made to a guardian or next of kin,
there is no therapeutic argument for nondisclosure.
227. Cf California Natural Death Act, CALiF. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189 (Supp.
1984) (providing for revocation of a "living will" at any time prior to physician's
actions in reliance thereon).
228. Most other forms of advance decision are recorded in writing, e.g., statutes, wills,
directives to terminate life-sustaining treatment, and certain important types of
contract. Written memorialization is particularly important where the instruc-
tion is lengthy, complex, or subject to varying interpretations.
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mental illness. These conditional instructions may be relatively easy
for the physician to interpret and implement, as the above illustra-
tions document. On the other hand, a patient beset by mixed feelings
on the question may make vague or contradictory statements as to
what the physician should do. Here again a form proves useful. It
forces the patient to formulate his wishes more clearly in order that
he may write them in the limited space available on the form. Reread-
ing his written words should make unclear and inconsistent instruc-
tions more apparent, again abetting more careful formulation of ideas.
The physician must supplement this process with careful questioning,
based on his knowledge of the types of situation in which he might be
inclined to withhold information. 229 Further refinement of the in-
structions should result from this conversation. Because the presump-
tion must favor disclosure, the physician may not withhold
information except in circumstances reasonably encompassed within
the instructions on the form. The drafting of the instructions, and the
physician's subsequent implementation of them, should be carried out
with an eye to this fundamental precept.
The foregoing proposal differs from the present practice of many
physicians only in the directness of the patient's involvement in the
decisionmaking. It is not unusual for a physician to base decisions con-
cerning the extent of disclosure of his previous experience with the
patient and the knowledge he has garnered of that patient's informa-
tional desires.230 His decision thus reflects the choice he believes the
patient would have made if given the opportunity. This type of vicari-
ous decisionmaking, termed "substituted judgment,"231 has been judi-
cially approved for patients who are incapable of making their own
decisions because of incompetence.2 32 There is no justification, how-
ever, for employing this technique with a person who has the capacity
and opportunity to make his own decision. 233 Modification of present
229. On the importance of conversation between physician and patient, see J. KATZ,
supra note 24, at 130-64. Katz asserts that it is the physician's duty to assist the
patient's decisional process by offering "[c]onsiderations to aid his judgment, ex-
hortation to strengthen his will." Id. at 123 (quoting J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 21-23
(1859)).
230. See, e.g., Liepman, Deception in the Teaching Hospital: Where We've Been and
Where We're Going, 189 PROGRESS IN CLINICAL & BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 87, 89-
90 (1983).
231. The doctrine of substituted judgment orders a court or other authorized person,
in making a decision for an incompetent, to make the decision as would the in-
competent if he possessed the capacity to do so. The decision must be based on
the actual interests and preferences of the incompetent. Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432
(1977).
232. E.g., Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445
S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
233. Even were the theory of substitution of judgment in this context acceptable, the
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practice to provide the patient with an oportunity to make the disclo-
sure decision thus seems a feasible and fair means of accomodating the
interests of diverse patients in regard to therapeutic nondisclosures.
The autonomy of a patient desiring nondisclosure in some or all
circumstances could be enhanced further if he could designate the per-
son empowered to make treatment decisions when full disclosure to
the patient himself is waived. In the absence of such delegation, the
ultimate decision regarding treatment would be made by the physi-
cian, there being no one else with sufficient information to do so.
Although the patient ratifies the decision, he lacks knowledge of ma-
terial risks and cannot be regarded as a true decision maker. That a
patient wishes to be spared potentially harmful information does not
necessarily mean that he wishes the physician to make treatment deci-
sions for him. But without the delegation alternative, he cannot
choose one without the other. If the patient can delegate the treat-
ment decision to a third party who knows him and understands his
values, his autonomy in regard to both decisions-whether nonthera-
peutic information should be withheld and whether the recommended
treatment should proceed--can be protected simultaneously.
Some of the cases and statutes providing for a therapeutic privilege
appear to recognize the incursion on autonomy produced by such a
rule and the inappropriateness of awarding the power to make the
therapeutic decision to the physician by default. This attitude is evi-
denced by requirements that a third party close to the patient be in-
cluded in the decision making process. In the two statutes containing
such provisions,23 4 the third party's participation is limited to the re-
ceipt of information withheld from the patient. Cases addressing the
issue, however, seem to have recognized that the disclosure of infor-
mation to a third party fails altogether to remedy the incursion on
autonomy if the third party lacks power to act on the information.235
Thus, they state that disclosure to the third party should be "with a
view to securing consent to the proposed treatment."23 6 The cases do
not refer to the corollary power to refuse. Nor do they suggest to the
physician how he should deal with a situation where the patient, not
problems discussed supra note 212, render the physician an inappropriate substi-
tute decision maker.
234. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651,9 (Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 1909(d) (Supp.
1984).
235. This interrelation was recognized by the court in Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188,
198, 473 P.2d 116, 122 (1970): "If it should be the law, that, if the patient could not
be told, his spouse should be told, the necessary corollary of that requirement
would be that the spouse could refuse her consent to the proposed treatment."
Believing that the spouse had no such right, the court held the physicians had no
duty to make disclosures to the spouse. Id.
236. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,789 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cornfeldt v. Tongen,
262 N.W.2d 684, 701 n.14 (Minn. 1977).
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knowing that he lacks full information, has consented and the fully
informed third party has refused-a situation exacerbated by the fact
that the withholding of information and involvement of a third party
have all been directed by the physician and the judges or legislators of
the state unbeknownst to the patient.237 Moreover, there is no basis
for presuming that some legally designated third party would dupli-
cate the decision making process of the patient.238
The blueprint for a more satisfactory remedy is found in the Model
Health-Care Consent Act.239 This proposal, which is applicable to a
far broader range of health care decisions than just therapeutic non-
disclosures,240 allows a competent adult to "appoint another as a
health-care representative to act for the appointor in matters affecting
his health care."241 The powers of the health care representative-
who may, but need not, be a relative-are defined by the written in-
strument effecting the appointment.242 His authority may be limited
to situations in which the appointor has become incapacitated to make
his own decisions, or it may encompass some or all health care decision
making regardless of the patient's competence.2 43 The power to dele-
gate health care decision making contained in this provision of the
Model Act has been enacted into law in some jurisdictions either by
special statute or as part of the durable power of attorney statute.2 44
Appending to the advance decision making technique a power to
delegate similar to that provided for by the Model Act maximizes self-
determination in situations where nondisclosure is a recommended
therapy. First, it allocates to the patient the choice of a surrogate deci-
sion maker rather than leaving the determination to the law. Further,
the law is inherently disabled from abrogating autonomy in regard to
the ultimate decision of whether or not a particular treatment should
be administered. It is impossible for a judge or legislature to designate
an individual who will consistently understand the values important
to the patient. Since the patient is unlikely to be aware of the legal
delegation of authority, there is no particular reason why he would
have discussed his values and priorities with the designated individual.
Delegation by the patient himself results in designation of the specific
237. The potential for such a situation brings to mind the old saw, "Oh, what a tangled
web we weave when first we practice to deceive."
238. See supra notes 211-13.
239. 9 U.L.A. 391 (Supp. 1985).
240. The provisions of the Model Act govern consent to "any care, treatment, service
or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual's physical or mental
condition. Id. § 1(2) at 393.
241. Id. § 6(a) at 398.
242. E.g., id. §§ 6(a), (d), (e).
243. See id. § 6(f).
244. E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2432 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(b)
to (c) (Supp. 1982). See generally Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical
Treatment Choices, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 985 (1984).
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person in whose decisions the patient feels most confident or whom he
believes most likely to duplicate his own decisions. It also impresses
upon the patient the need to make sure that the designated person is
aware of the patient's attitudes concerning health care, thus encourag-
ing a type of needed discourse that rarely occurs in the present legal
milieu.
Allowing the patient to delegate decision-making authority could
still create the dilemma of conflicting decisions-consent by the unin-
formed patient and refusal by the fully informed surrogate. The di-
lemma can be avoided, however, by presenting the matter first to the
surrogate; only if the surrogate consents would further consent be
sought from the patient himself.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the therapeutic justification for nondisclosure has re-
ceived widespread judicial and legislative endorsement, there has been
little exploration of the rationale for and ramifications of the concept.
This Article has attempted to demonstrate the narrowness of the con-
cept and the need for thorough examination of the medical grounds
for asserting that any particular patient should be denied information
on this basis. At most, a therapeutic justification for nondisclosure
should be accepted only where the physician can produce medical
knowledge suggesting that a patient in the situation of the plaintiff
was substantially likely to suffer significant harm as a result of the
disclosure. Even where such evidence is available, however, it is the
position of this author that the denial of information, and hence
choice, to the patient is not legally tenable. The only justification for
interfering so dramatically with a patient's choice in medical matters
is that the patient himself has directed the withholding. Because non-
disclosure might be the choice of significant numbers of patients, they
should be afforded the opportunity to make that choice in an appropri-
ate setting outside the therapeutic context within which the disclosure
or nondisclosure is to occur. This proposal provides maximum protec-
tion to both the autonomy and health interests of patients by placing
the choice in the hands of the patient, where it belongs, rather than
with the physician, a court, or a legislature.
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